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PROGRESSIVITY IN TAX 
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY* 
JAMES R. HINES JR.† 
ABSTRACT 
We argue that a spending tax, as opposed to an income or wage tax, is 
the last best hope for a return to significantly more progressive marginal 
tax rates than obtain today. The simple explanation for this central claim 
looks to incentive effects, especially for rich people. High marginal tax 
rates under an income tax fall on and hence deter the productive activities 
of work and saving. High marginal rates under a wage tax fall on and 
hence deter the productive activity of work alone. But high marginal rates 
under a spending tax fall on and hence deter high-end spending, which is 
arguably a social bad, and do not necessarily deter the social goods of 
work and saving; indeed, a progressive spending tax may increase saving. 
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The idea is that because one can escape or defer paying taxes under a 
progressive spending tax by saving, an activity with positive social 
externalities, the efficiency costs of high marginal rates under a spending 
tax can be mitigated. A spending tax can bear more steeply progressive 
rates with less cost in efficiency or social wealth than an income or wage 
tax. A progressive spending tax also holds out the possibility of sorting the 
rich or high-ability into two groups, elastic savers and inelastic spenders: 
separating the two types of taxpayers could yield welfare gains unavailable 
under income or wage taxes, which under current technologies can only 
sort the high-ability into workers and nonworkers. Progressive spending 
taxes also fall on consumption financed by windfall gains, doing so with 
diminished adverse incentive effects. 
Most of the Article sets out analytic possibilities. In the final part, we 
add a sketch of both a welfarist and a fairness-based argument for 
progressive spending taxes and conclude with a call for a major new 
research agenda. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Pity President Obama. Pity tax. Pity the dreams of progressives 
everywhere. 
Barack Obama‘s presidential campaign gave believers in 
redistribution a brief shining moment of hope. Obama‘s candidacy featured 
stirring calls for the richest Americans to give back and share more with 
their less fortunate fellow citizens. Yet even then, beneath the high-flying 
rhetoric, lay reason for despair, for there was little talk about any kind of 
significant return to progressivity in the tax system, the main policy 
instrument for effecting redistribution in America. Deep into Obama‘s 
presidency, the Obama Administration has been unable to enact the most 
progressive element in Obama‘s tax program: a partial repeal of President 
George W. Bush‘s 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, largely meaning a restoration of 
the two top marginal rate brackets under the federal income tax from 33 
and 35 to 35 and 39.6 percent, respectively.1 The President has consistently 
 
 1. For the budget proposal, which restates the President‘s never-enacted proposal in regard to 
marginal tax rate increases, see Jackie Calmes, In Proposal, Obama Takes the Long View, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2010, at A17; Sam Goldfarb, With Economy Still Unsettled, Obama’s Budget Treads Carefully, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 2010, available at 2010 TNT 21-1 (LEXIS); Chuck O‘Toole, Obama 
Scales Back Tax Agenda in Fiscal 2011 Budget, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 2010, available at 2010 
TNT 21-2 (LEXIS). For illustrative campaign rhetoric, consider, for example, the following exchange 
in the Democratic presidential debate before ―Super Tuesday.‖ Moderator Wolf Blitzer of CNN asked 
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underscored that no one earning under a $250,000 income—that is, no one 
not among the top few percentage points of earners2—would see a tax 
increase, and no one at all would see his or her rates raised above the level 
they reached by 1999.3 And the President is persistently at pains to stress 
that he would not actually even be raising anyone‘s tax rate, simply letting 
the Bush tax cuts expire for top earners.4 Yet it is far from clear that even 
 
candidates Hilary Clinton and Obama to clarify their positions on income tax reform: 
BLITZER: . . . I just want to be precise. When you let—if you become president, either one of 
you—let the Bush tax cuts lapse, there will be effectively tax increases on millions of 
Americans. 
OBAMA: On wealthy Americans. 
CLINTON: That‘s right.  
OBAMA: And look . . .  
BLITZER: And you are willing to go into . . . 
(CROSSTALK) 
OBAMA: I‘m not bashful about it. 
CLINTON: Absolutely. Absolutely. 
OBAMA: I suspect a lot of this crowd—it looks like a pretty well-dressed crowd—potentially 
will pay a little bit more. I will pay a little bit more. 
. . . . 
CLINTON: But Wolf, it‘s just really important to underscore here that we will go back to the 
tax rates we had before George Bush became president. And my memory is, people did really 
well during that time period. 
(APPLAUSE) 
Senator Barack Obama & Senator Hillary Clinton, Democratic Presidential Candidates Debate from the 
Kodak Theatre in Los Angeles (Jan. 31, 2008) (first two ellipses in original) (transcript available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/31/dem.debate.transcript/).  
 2. Emmanual Saez suggests that $250,000 per year would cover 3–4 percent of earners. See 
Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated Using 
2006 Preliminary Estimates) 1 (Mar. 15, 2008) (unpublished note), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/ 
~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2006prel.pdf. That figure may be too high. Census publications indicate that 
the ninety-fifth percentile of income earners in 2007 began at $177,000 of household income. See 
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
P60-235, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 40 
(2008). Census Bureau data for 2008 indicate that households earning over $250,000 per year constitute 
2.11 percent of the total population. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, TABLE 
HINC-6. INCOME DISTRIBUTION TO $250,000 OR MORE FOR HOUSEHOLDS: 2008, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/hhinc/new06_000.htm. 
 3. In March 2009, President Obama announced the formation of a Tax Reform Panel led by 
former Federal Reserve Chairperson Paul Volcker. See Meg Shreve, White House Announces 
Formation of Tax Reform Panel, 122 TAX NOTES 1539, 1539 (2009). The ―constraints‖ imposed on the 
panel were that there could be no tax increases at all in 2009 and 2010, and that no one earning less than 
$250,000 would ever see any tax increase. See id.  
 The story of the possible taxation of bonuses received by AIG executives at 90 percent rates 
hardly belies our general theme. See Administration: Changes May Be Needed in 90-Percent Tax on 
AIG Bonuses, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 22, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/first100days/2009/03/ 
22/administration-changes-needed-percent-tax-aig-bonuses/. For one thing, this potential tax was 
clearly intended to send a special and harsh message. For another thing, President Obama, in part 
because of concerns over incentive effects moving forward, ultimately failed to support the idea and it 
was quietly tabled. See id.  
 4. See Ross Colvin, Obama to Allow Bush Tax Cuts to Expire on Schedule, REUTERS, Feb. 21, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51K1ZF20090221.  
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this modest change will happen. Alternative tax reform plans, such as the 
Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010, sponsored by 
Senators Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), tellingly feature a 
top marginal rate bracket of 35 percent.5 
Yet a 39.6 percent top rate is far below one-half of the highest 
marginal rate in the less-than-century-long history of the contemporary 
income tax, a rate of 94 percent obtained in the midst of World War II.6 
Tax rates persisted as high as 90 percent throughout the 1950s until 
President Kennedy cut the top rate to 70 percent in 1964.7 That rate, in turn, 
obtained until 1981 when President Reagan first cut it to 50 percent before 
bringing it down to 33 or 28 percent (depending on how one looked at 
things) in 1986.8 President Obama is advocating to raise the top rate on 
highest income earners by a mere 4.6 percentage points in absolute terms, 
resulting in a final top rate more than 54 percentage points lower than the 
historical peak, and far below the rate that obtained for more than four 
decades from 1941 to 1986. 
This is hardly radical stuff. Yet the last days of the presidential 
campaign, featuring Senator John McCain‘s whole-hearted embrace of ―Joe 
the Plumber,‖ showed that even Obama‘s extremely modest proposal was 
extremely controversial.9 McCain sneeringly called Obama 
―Redistributionist in Chief,‖10 even as Obama himself tried to distance 
 
 5. See Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010, S. 3018, 111th Cong. § 101(a) 
(2010); Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Miracle on the Potomac: A Bipartisan Tax Proposal, 126 TAX NOTES 
1543, 1543 (2010). 
 6. See STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 84 (2008). 
For historical background on tax rates, see id.; C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX 
POLICY (2d ed. 2008); and JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN‘S GUIDE TO 
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 16–28 (4th ed. 2008). 
 7. STEUERLE, supra note 6, at 46. 
 8. Id. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-154, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), introduced a top individual tax rate of 28 percent and many individual 
tax changes, including one that required high-income individuals to reduce their exemptions and 
deductions as their incomes rose over a range. STEUERLE, supra note 6, at 122–23; Edward J. 
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1898 (1994). Due to the reduction in 
exemptions and deductions, an individual‘s total tax burden rose by $33 for every additional $100 of 
earnings within this range, which can therefore be interpreted as a marginal tax rate of 33 percent.  
 9. Foon Rhee, McCain: Joe the Plumber Right About Obama’s Socialist Tax Plan, 
BOSTON.COM, Oct. 18, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2008/10/ 
mccain_joe_the.html.  
 10. McCain: Obama “Redistributionist in Chief,” UPI.COM, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.upi. 
com/Top_News/2008/10/28/McCain-Obama-redistributionist-in-chief/UPI-62821225212571/. See also 
Michael Cooper, ―Spreading the Wealth” as Both Accusation and Prescription, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2008, at A20. 
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himself from the word ―redistribution‖ or any of its cognates.11 Obama 
continues to insist that his proposals would not actually raise any tax rate; 
letting the Bush tax cuts expire would simply restore the status quo 
obtaining before Bush took office. Still, the attacks on the marginal tax rate 
proposals come swiftly and furiously.12 While an existing fiscal crisis 
makes a return to 1999, at least for the very top income earners, quite 
possible, it is too early to tell on that score. Attempts to interject more 
progressivity, as in the quickly aborted ―surcharge‖ under health care 
reform, appear utterly unrealistic.13  
What are we doing? Where are we headed? Are we forever set in a 
post-Reagan mindset when it comes to tax rates? What has happened to the 
argument for more steeply progressive marginal rates? Why does a country 
that seems to believe in redistribution not seek it more forcefully in its 
major policy instrument devoted to doing so? 
There are many aspects of an acceptable answer to these puzzling 
questions, involving politics, perception, and more.14 This Article adds one 
important piece from the teachings of neoclassical economics and 
traditional tax policy. It explains that the case for more progression in tax 
rates has been fatally hampered by the choice of tax base. This is, in part, a 
story of how academics, ordinary politics, popular understanding, and 
inertia can lead a democracy to a place far removed from its initial hopes 
and dreams. We wanted a progressive tax system over a century ago,15 and 
 
 11. See David Leonhardt, A Free-Market-Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally Conservative Wealth 
Redistributionist, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at MM30. 
 12. See Richard Wolf, Obama’s Budget Draws Rapid Fire; Lawmakers Lament Spending, Want 
to Lower Deficit More, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2010, at A8. 
 13. Congress first proposed the surcharge in the summer of 2009. See The Small Business Surtax, 
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A12. But there was widespread opposition, and Congress soon backed 
off. See Pelosi: Reducing Health Care Surcharge for Wealthy a Possibility, TALK RADIO NEWS 
SERVICE, July 16, 2009, http://talkradionews.com/2009/07/pelosi-reducing-health-care-surcharge-for-
wealthy-a-possibility/ (stating that House Speaker Nancy Pelosi suggested that a high-income surcharge 
could be reduced). The idea appears not yet dead. See Obama’s Health Care Proposal, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/February/22/Obama-Health-Care-
Proposal.aspx. 
 14. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 2 (2008) (exploring the ―political causes and consequences of economic inequality in 
America‖); Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its Absence), in 
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 85, 85–87 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (showing 
how redistributive effects of law changes can be hidden and underconsidered by subjects in Web-based 
experiments); Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American 
Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15, 22–23 (2005) (suggesting that confusion and the salience of narrow self-
interest over ideology lead people to oppose redistribution). 
 15. See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 101–09 (2d 
ed. 1908) (describing mechanisms of progressive taxation); ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN 
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we continue to say that we want one.16 Yet somehow we are unable to get 
what we want. Indeed, we are unable to take even baby steps in the 
direction of what we say we want.  
Why? Simply put, there are compelling economic reasons for avoiding 
more steeply progressive rates under an income or a wage tax, such as we 
have in America today. People and politicians have figured this out. 
President Reagan successfully made the case over thirty years ago, and 
there was already powerful academic and intellectual support for it in the 
writings of Nobel laureate James Mirrlees and others.17 Political rhetoric 
picked up and tracked the economic fundamentals. The journalist David 
Leonhardt, in a long profile of Obama‘s economic philosophy published in 
The New York Times shortly before the election, reflected the prevailing 
view: 
When Reagan was elected, in 1980, tax rates on top incomes were so 
high that even liberal economists now say the economy was suffering. 
There simply wasn‘t enough of an incentive for rich people to start new 
companies or expand existing ones, because so much of their profits 
would have gone to the federal government.18 
By 1980, ―even liberal economists‖ had come to fret over the effects 
of high tax rates on productive incentives. But note that Mirrlees‘s 
important academic analysis, Reagan‘s political rhetoric and 
accomplishments, and Leonhardt‘s journalistic conclusion all relate to 
taxing income. Here is where inertia plays its pivotal role: by failing to 
rethink initial premises regarding the appropriate tax base, we have doomed 
the prospects for more progressive tax rates. In this Article, we argue that 
switching to a spending tax base holds out the possibility for a new analysis 
and a return to more steeply progressive marginal tax rates. Hence our title: 
we believe that a spending tax is the last best hope for progressivity in tax.  
 
THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 176–229 & passim 
(1993) (discussing the role of progressive thought and movement leading up to the enactment of the 
Sixteenth Amendment). 
 16. See Frank Newport, Americans More in Favor of Heavily Taxing Rich Now Than in 1939, 
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 16, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/27208/americans-more-favor-
heavily-taxing-rich-now-than-1939.aspx (reporting that half of Americans favor heavy taxes on the rich 
to redistribute wealth). 
 17. See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 175, 208 (1971) (concluding that ―[t]he income-tax is a much less effective tool for 
reducing inequalities than has often been thought‖). We discuss optimal tax theory at greater length in 
Part IV.D. 
 18. Leonhardt, supra note 11. See also Alan D. Viard, The Trouble with Taxing Those at the Top, 
TAX POL'Y OUTLOOK, June 2007, at 1, 1 (arguing that raising the marginal tax rate for the top income 
earners is ―an inefficient and undesirable way to generate revenue‖). 
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The simple explanation for this central claim looks to the pattern of 
incentive effects, especially on rich people, as both economists and 
commentators such as Leonhardt tend to focus.19 High marginal tax rates 
under an income tax fall on and hence deter the productive activities of 
work and saving. High marginal rates under a wage tax fall on and hence 
deter the productive activity of work alone. But high marginal rates under a 
spending tax fall on and hence deter high-end spending, which is arguably 
a social bad, and do not necessarily deter the social goods of work and 
saving. Indeed, high marginal tax rates under a spending tax may even 
promote more private saving. Hence it is possible to have higher marginal 
rates under a spending tax than under a wage or income tax with equivalent 
or lower efficiency costs. 
This is a possible empirical result. In this Article, we present the 
analytic arguments for it and sketch out a research agenda that might verify 
it. The idea is that because one can escape or defer paying taxes under a 
progressive spending tax by saving—an activity with positive social 
externalities—the efficiency costs of high marginal rates under a spending 
tax can be mitigated. Unless people work only in order to be able to spend 
on themselves, and even then only if they fully internalize in their present 
labor-supply decisions the ultimate tax they will pay—and we argue that 
each of these assumptions is unlikely to hold in the extreme—a spending 
tax can bear more progressive rates with less cost in efficiency or social 
wealth than can an income or wage tax. A progressive spending tax also 
holds out the possibility of sorting the rich or high-ability20 into two 
groups: elastic savers and inelastic spenders.21 This could yield welfare 
gains unavailable under income or wage taxes, which, given present 
technologies, can only sort the high-ability into workers and nonworkers. 
Finally, progressive spending taxes, unlike wage taxes, fall on consumption 
financed by windfall gains, as to which unexpected good fortune ex ante 
incentive effects are likely to be weak—and hence such taxes should have 
lower efficiency costs. 
We know that our central claim will seem counterintuitive to many, 
perhaps most, readers. How can a spending tax be more progressive than an 
income tax? Since most income is spent, the two tax bases are obviously 
similar, indeed identical for the vast majority of American taxpayer-
 
 19. Leonhardt, supra note 11. 
 20. The term ―high-ability‖ is used in the optimal tax literature to refer to taxpayers who could 
earn high incomes, regardless of whether they choose to do so. See infra Part IV.D. 
 21. ―Elastic‖ and ―inelastic‖ are also terms of economic art. An ―elastic‖ taxpayer reacts to a tax-
law change, and an ―inelastic‖ taxpayer does not. See infra Part IV.D.  
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worker-spenders. Any differences follow from the fact that a spending tax 
base does not include income that is earned and not spent—that is, savings. 
Since the rich do most of the saving, it would seem as if their incomes are 
the ones that are most exempted by a spending tax. Therefore, at first blush 
it appears that a spending tax would have to be less progressive than an 
income tax.  
This initial take on the matter, however, fails fully to factor in the 
effect of the choice of tax base on the pattern of feasible tax rates. If tax 
rates under a spending tax are considerably more progressive than those 
under an income tax—and there is ample reason to think this can be the 
case—then a spending tax can be the more progressive alternative. That is 
the project for this Article. 
What about the comparison between a spending tax and a wage tax? 
While these tax systems are commonly lumped together in the economics 
and tax policy literatures as roughly equivalent variants of consumption 
taxes,22 and in fact have clear analytic similarities, there are nonetheless 
important practical differences. One especially important difference is that 
a wage tax does not attempt to tax unexpectedly high returns on capital 
investments, sometimes known as ―windfalls.‖ It is not only the case that 
the rich save; it is also the case that the ―ex post rich‖—those who turn out 
to be rich, looking backward through time—tend to be those whose capital 
investments earned extremely high, indeed unexpectedly high, returns. 
Most of Warren Buffett‘s or Bill Gates‘s income has come from capital—
specifically, the capital appreciation in the price of Berkshire Hathaway or 
Microsoft stock—and hence would be exempt from wage taxation.23 Yet 
the same income would be taxed under a spending tax when consumed. A 
spending tax alone among feasible alternatives can collect significant tax 
revenue from the propertied, capitalist classes in a way that does not 
necessarily undercut their incentives to become propertied in the first place. 
The Article begins with an overview of the logic of tax, progresses to 
separate consideration of the base and rate issues, and then, in combining 
bases and rates, turns to an explanation of why more progressive rates 
 
 22.  See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC 
TAX REFORM 110–11 (1984) [hereinafter BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS]; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, 
at 199–200 (discussing the general equivalence of a consumption tax and a wage tax); SLEMROD & 
BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 231–68 (discussing various consumption tax alternatives). 
 23.  The payroll tax does not apply to capital gains at all. Tax on capital appreciation is also 
easily deferred or avoided altogether under the current income tax. See Edward J. McCaffery, A New 
Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 885–99 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery, A New 
Understanding]; infra Part IX.A.  
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under wage or income taxes are unlikely and unwise, but possible—and 
possibly desirable—under a spending tax. We end with a call for more 
research, and hope. 
II.  THE LOGIC OF TAX 
Any tax is the product of a base—what is being taxed—and a rate—
how much the base is being taxed. The government must choose both, a 
base-rate pair. Tax policy for decades, and by some measures centuries, has 
exhaustively considered the base question, where a debate has raged over 
income versus consumption taxes.24 A far quieter debate has taken place on 
the rate structure, where proponents of progressivity—the norm of 
expecting the rich (or those with greater ―ability to pay‖) to pay more, in 
percent terms, than the not-rich—have been hanging on, fighting back 
political and, to some extent, intellectual arguments for flat-rate taxation.25 
The dominant framework for the analysis of tax rates has become the 
optimal income tax literature, most importantly owing to Mirrlees‘s work 
starting in the early 1970s.26  
For the most part, the base and rate issues have not been well joined. 
Where they have been connected, a basic misunderstanding haunts the 
 
 24. The fountainhead for the debate can be found in JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848). Subsequent contributions 
include IRVING FISHER & HERBERT W. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION: A PROPOSAL FOR 
REFORM 3–5 (1942); and NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 46–53 (1955). The classic 
argument in an American law review context was presented in William D. Andrews, A Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, A 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax]; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975); William D. 
Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 
(1975); and Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 
1081 (1980). For more recent discussion, see Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority 
of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Joseph 
Bankman & David Weisbach, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 789 (2007); and Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
745 (2007). For a summary of the intellectual history of the debate, with many citations, see McCaffery, 
A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 838–44.  
 25. The classic argument for progressive tax rates is found in WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY 
KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). Other works include SELIGMAN, 
supra note 15, at 101–09; Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: 
A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987); and Harvey S. Rosen, Income-Tax 
Progressivity: A Century-Old Debate, FED. RES. BANK PHILA. BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 1990, at 3. For 
recent statements in favor of flat-rate or proportionate taxation, see ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN 
RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1985). For counterarguments, see Joseph Bankman & Barbara Fried, 
Flatness and Fairness, BOSTON REV., Summer 1996, at 3, available at 
http://bostonreview.net/BR21.3/Bankman.html. 
 26. Mirrlees, supra note 17.  
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analysis. The case for consumption taxation, gaining adherents at an 
accelerating pace in the academy, has been unnecessarily linked in the 
intellectual history of tax with flat or proportionate tax rates.27  
While tax bases and tax rates are analytically distinct subject matters, 
logically separable, they are connected politically, rhetorically, and 
economically. The choice of base affects the arguments for and the 
economic effects of the degree of progression in the tax rate structure, and 
vice versa. Our primary purpose in this Article is to press a positive, 
descriptive argument that, in general, the nature of the effects of tax rates 
depends on the tax base and, in particular, the case for significant increases 
in the progressivity of the marginal rate structure is stronger under a certain 
form of consumption tax—namely (and all equivalently), a ―postpaid,‖ 
expenditure, or spending tax—than it is under either an income or a wage 
tax. We turn next to explore those tax bases. 
III.  TAX BASES 
A.  INCOME TAX 
We begin with an income tax, the most commonly thought of 
comprehensive individual tax system. An income tax falls on all present-
period earnings, from ―whatever source derived,‖ in the language of the 
Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution28 and § 61(a) of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Code (―I.R.C.‖)29—that is, from labor or capital (and, 
arguably, from beneficent transfers as well). As Henry Simons put it in an 
influential definition named after him and his predecessor Robert Murray 
Haig: ―[I]ncome may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market 
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of 
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question.‖30 We can restate this definition, in reality a simple accounting 
relation or tautology, as: 
Income = Consumption + Saving 
This tells us little more than the facts that inputs or incomes must equal 
outputs or outflows, or that all wealth (Income) must be either spent 
 
 27. See McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 841–44. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 29. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 30. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (―Haig-Simons definition‖). 
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(Consumption) or not (Saving).  
From the Haig-Simons definition we can see that saving is at a 
disadvantage compared to immediate consumption under an income tax. 
Wealth is taxed when it first comes into a household, typically via wages. 
For wealth that is not immediately consumed, a further tax is levied on the 
yield to capital, as when interest is credited to a bank account, or stocks or 
real estate rise in value. As John Stuart Mill first pointed out in 1848, the 
inclusion of the yield to capital in the income tax base makes it a double tax 
on saving.31  
B.  TWO CONSUMPTION TAXES 
In part to avoid the income tax‘s double-tax sting and its attendant 
distortions, critics have long advocated some form of consumption tax that 
would exempt taxes on saving from the tax base, on both economic 
efficiency and fairness grounds.32 The efficiency case against taxing the 
yield to capital is strong. An income tax creates a bias in favor of present 
consumption over deferred consumption, that is, saving. The bias of the tax 
widens over time. Compound interest implies that the tax system‘s 
distortions loom larger as the time horizon lengthens, thereby making even 
a very low rate tax on the yield to capital highly distortionary over a 
lifetime perspective. A 30 percent tax on the yield to capital, for example, 
increases the cost of tomorrow‘s consumption relative to today‘s, but it 
much more dramatically increases the cost of consumption ten years from 
now compared to today‘s.  
The case for consumption taxation is not just a matter of efficiency or 
traditional welfare economics analysis. Taxing saving at a time of low 
aggregate national and individual saving strikes many as an unwise idea—
one that is unfair to the vast numbers of middle-class Americans attempting 
to save for retirement, buy a house, put their children through college, 
hedge against economic misfortune, and so on. It should not therefore be 
surprising to learn that the so-called income tax is replete with nominally 
prosaving provisions, reflecting the ambivalence of policy.33 
The case for consumption taxation has deep roots, going back to 
 
 31. MILL, supra note 24, at 179–80. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 179–81; FISHER & FISHER, supra note 24, at 3–5; KALDOR, supra note 24, at 
14–15; Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, supra note 24, at 1115, 
1122–23. 
 33. For our discussion of ―hybrids,‖ see infra Part VI. For our discussion of the real-world tax 
system, see infra Part IX. 
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Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century and Adam Smith in the 
eighteenth, before moving on to Mill in the nineteenth and Irving Fisher, 
Nicholas Kaldor, and others in the twentieth. In contemporary times, 
however, the case for moving to a consumption tax has been held back by 
analytic confusion: it seems as if a standard consumption tax must be more 
regressive than an income tax. This is so both for reasons of the base—
because a consumption tax is thought not to include the yield to capital, the 
virtually exclusive domain of the rich, at all—and of rates—because it is 
further thought that a certain form of consumption tax, in order to be a 
consumption tax at all, must feature flat rates.  
To see this latter point, it helps to understand the two canonical types 
of consumption taxes. Tax policy theorists have noted the equivalence of 
two forms of consumption-based taxes under plausible assumptions, 
namely the ―prepaid‖ or ―yield-exempt‖ tax model and the ―postpaid,‖ 
cash-flow, or expenditure tax model.34 We shall hereafter refer to these two 
forms of consumption tax by their most commonly known incarnations: 
wage and spending taxes, respectively. If tax rates do not change and there 
is no uncertainty, then levying a tax upfront, and never again, as with a 
wage tax, is equivalent to deferring the tax and levying it at the single time 
of ultimate private preclusive use, as with a spending tax.35 This point is 
evident algebraically, which we set out in the notes,36 and through a simple 
example.  
Suppose that Ant, the iconic saver, earns $200 from labor efforts, the 
tax rate is 50%, and the yield to capital is 10%. Ant will save for two full 
years then consume. Under a wage tax, Ant‘s $200 is reduced to $100 right 
away. This grows to $100 + $10, or $110 after one year, and $110 + $11, or 
$121 after two years. Ant spends away.  
 
 34. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 67–68, 72–73 (1986); BRADFORD, 
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 22, at 110–11; Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income 
Tax, supra note 24, at 1126. 
 35. See Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, supra note 24, at 
1126; McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 824–27; Edward J. McCaffery, Three Views 
of Tax, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 153, 156 (2005).  
 36. Consider the formula for the future value (FV) of a present amount (P), invested over a 
number of periods (n) at a rate of return (r): 
FV = P (1 + r) n 
Since the rate of return is predictable and the tax rate is constant, it does not matter when the 
government reduces potential consumption by a tax rate (t), leaving the taxpayer to consume (1 – t). 
Under the commutative principle of multiplication, which holds that ab = ba: 
(1 – t) P (1 + r) n = P (1 + r) n (1 – t). 
This identity holds as long as t is constant. 
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Under a spending tax, Ant gets to save the full $200 without any 
initial tax. This sum grows to $200 + $20, or $220, after one year, and $220 
+ $22, or $242, after two years. When Ant goes to spend, the government 
comes to assert its 50% stake under the spending tax. This reduces Ant‘s 
$242 to $121, just as under the wage tax model. The algebraic formulation 
set out in the notes proves that this result is not simply an artifact of the 
numbers chosen for the example, but a fully general result, as long as the 
tax rate is constant. It is straightforward to show as well that the result 
continues to hold with a predictable or fully anticipated, varying rate of 
return.  
We can see the same idea more graphically. Return to the basic Haig-
Simons definition of Income: 
Income = Consumption + Saving 
This basic identity identifies sources with uses. The income tax is a classic 
source-based tax, looking, in the language of the Constitution, to all 
―incomes, from whatever source derived.‖37 Consider what the sources of 
income might be, in broad terms: payments for labor or for capital. 
Ultimately, all income derives from one or both of these two factors of 
production, one‘s own or another‘s (in the case of gifts and bequests). In 
short: 
Labor + Capital → Income = Consumption + Saving 
A wage tax gets to be a single tax on saving by exempting capital as a 
source of income on the left-hand side of the equation, as it were. A wage 
tax, like an income tax, is source-based, but systematically ignores the 
return to financial capital as a source. Think of the payroll tax or Social 
Security / Medicare contribution system, which make no attempt to tax 
saving. A spending tax, on the other hand, exempts saving as a use, that is, 
on the right-hand side of the equation, as it were, following the simple logic 
of  
Income – Saving = Consumption 
Think of a common sales tax, which does not apply to money saved in a 
bank account. Both wage and spending taxes are single taxes on a 
household‘s flow of funds, whether saved or spent, and are broadly 
equivalent at constant rates. 
 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
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C.  THE TRADITIONAL INCOME-VERSUS-CONSUMPTION TAX DEBATE 
The income-versus-consumption tax debate has taken place in the 
shadows of Mill‘s critique of the income tax as a double tax on saving or 
(equivalently) nonconsumed wealth, and the analytic understanding just 
sketched out. Wage taxes exempt capital returns by design. For spending 
taxes to produce the same result, they must feature flat tax rates. This 
traditional view of tax has been unfortunate, because the systematic 
nontaxation of the return to financial capital is only one reason for moving 
to a consumption tax, and not necessarily the best reason. Our central claim 
in this Article is that restoring or increasing progressivity in the marginal 
rate structure is another reason to adopt a consumption tax of the right 
sort—a spending tax.38 To see this point, it is important to understand the 
traditional income-versus-consumption tax debate, and then to get beyond 
it.39 
It is easy enough to see that a wage tax avoids the double-tax sting of 
the income tax. Such taxes have, indeed, been the most popular form of tax 
reform proposal coming from conservative political factions of late: the 
most common ―flat-tax‖ plans, as from Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, 
feature a two-bracket wage tax with no additional taxation of saving.40 In 
order for the second form of consumption tax, the spending tax, to be 
equivalent to a wage tax and thus to avoid any taxation of saving, it must, 
as the Ant example illustrates, feature constant or relatively flat rates. 
Hence, the ―Fair Tax,‖ a widely publicized proposal for a national retail 
sales tax, features a flat-rate spending tax.41 Whether we want a spending 
 
 38. We state that a spending tax is the ―right‖ sort of consumption tax not for normative 
reasons—that a spending tax is ―better‖ than a wage tax—but for the analytic reason that the case for 
progressive marginal rates under a spending tax is stronger than under a wage or income tax: the central 
positive claim of this Article. We discuss in the concluding Part X whether this reason might lead to a 
normative argument for a progressive spending tax.  
 39. An income tax is, by design, a tax on wages combined with a double tax on saving. As Mill 
pointed out, the saver is left worse off than the immediate consumer under an income tax, and worse off 
than he or she would be under a consumption tax. MILL, supra note 24, at 179–80. The above equations 
can help us to see this, with a second tax (t) levied on the yield to capital (r) under an ideal income tax. 
The inequality below adds an income tax, on the left, to the wage and spending taxes, on the right:  
(1 – t) P (1 + (1 – t) r) n < (1 – t) P (1 + r) n = P (1 + r) n (1 – t) 
The addition of the second (1 – t) on the left—note that there are two t‘s for the income tax—reduces 
the after-tax yield to capital under an income tax below 100 percent, and thereby makes the income tax 
less favorable to savers than either a wage or a spending tax, at constant rates.  
 40. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 25, at 45–46, 55–58 (featuring an exempt level or ―zero 
bracket‖ and a positive tax bracket); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO MAKE THE 
TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER 51–53 (2002); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 235–36. 
 41. See generally NEAL BOORTZ, JOHN LINDER & ROB WOODALL, FAIRTAX: THE TRUTH: 
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tax to be equivalent to a wage tax, however, depends on why we want 
spending taxes, a decision that must be foundational to the inquiry. Hence 
we arrive at the following important general points: (1) if the principal aim 
of a consumption tax is to avoid any additional taxation of saving, the 
choices come down to wage or flat spending taxes, which are broadly 
equivalent; but (2) if we have another reason for moving to a consumption 
tax, particularly one looking to the rate structure, wage and spending taxes 
are no longer equivalent and more analysis must be done. A progressive 
spending tax emerges as a distinct option for comprehensive tax reform. 
D.  THREE TYPES OF TAX 
The traditional income-versus-consumption tax debate—centered on 
the yield to capital—in essence eliminated an important base-rate pair from 
further analysis: the progressive spending tax. Those who want to tax the 
yield to capital came to favor an income tax; those who thought it unfair or 
inefficient to ever tax saving favored a wage or a flat spending tax. Under 
progressive marginal rates, the automatic, analytic equivalence of wage and 
spending taxes disappears. The tax rate at the time of initial earnings may 
not be the same as that at the time of spending. Saving could be 
―subsidized‖ or ―penalized‖ vis-à-vis an income or a wage tax.42 This 
analytic fact led many to argue for flat- or constant-rate spending taxes 
because they thought it a norm not to tax capital or its yield at all—they 
bought into Mill.43 This argument, typically generated by policymakers 
invoking conceptions of fairness—and hence parallel to, but distinct from, 
the efficiency-based arguments—presumes that the principal normative 
reason for choosing a consumption tax turns on the principled nontaxation 
 
ANSWERING THE CRITICS (2008) (discussing a federal tax proposal featuring a flat-rate spending tax that 
would ―revolutionize‖ the American tax system); FairTax.org, Americans for Fair Taxation: The 
Basics, http://www.fairtax.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_basics_main (last visited July 14, 
2010) (proposing a national retail sales tax of 23 percent). See also Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David 
Rapson, Comparing Average and Marginal Tax Rates Under the FairTax and the Current System of 
Federal Taxation, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 421, 424–25 
(John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) (indicating that ―the FairTax‘s tax rate is 23 
percent‖). 
 42. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer 
Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363, 364–65 (1996); McCaffery, A New 
Understanding, supra note 23, at 814.  
 43. Others seem to take this fact as a semantic matter: namely, that a consumption tax must not 
include the yield to capital or it will not be a ―consumption‖ tax. Being semantics, one could have this 
fact any way one wants, as long as terms are consistently defined and used. In the interest of keeping 
semantics close to ordinary language, we define a postpaid consumption or expenditure—a spending—
tax as a ―consumption‖ tax, even if its rate structure means that the yield to capital will sometimes be 
taxed, by design. 
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of the yield to capital. It need not be so. Policymakers might desire a 
progressive tax on spending for reasons unrelated to the nontaxation of 
capital or its yield, or at least not precommitted to such nontaxation.  
Consider two distinct arguments. One, a progressive spending tax 
might generate a welfare-maximizing outcome: it might be the ―best‖ base-
rate pair in a specifically welfarist sense. This could be so, as we explain 
further below, because individuals in the face of such a tax may continue to 
work and save, avoiding present-period taxation but improving social 
welfare both by the positive externalities of their contributions to the 
capital stock and by the implicit deferred tax on saving. We call this the 
welfarist argument. Two, policymakers might consider it fair and 
appropriate to tax some but not all of the yield to capital, and a progressive 
spending tax is a particularly good and principled way to do so. We call 
this the fairness argument. We shall explain and explore these two 
arguments further below, and return to them especially in Part X, when we 
discuss normative implications of our analysis and call for further research.  
The critical descriptive, analytic point is that, with progressive 
marginal tax rates, there are three distinct choices for a comprehensive tax 
base: income, wage, and spending. Each affects the taxation of saving 
differently. A progressive income tax double taxes all saving, whatever the 
use of the savings. A progressive wage tax exempts all saving, whatever 
the use. A progressive spending tax splits the difference. To understand all 
this more fully, we need a richer understanding and vocabulary of different 
uses of savings, which is provided in Part V.A. We first leave tax base 
matters aside temporarily to develop a better vocabulary and understanding 
of tax rates, the other half of any base-rate pair. Progressivity is the main 
focus of the Article, and it is progressive rates that destroy the equivalence 
of wage and spending taxes and give us three, not two, choices for 
progressivity‘s future. 
IV.  TAX RATES  
A.  VOCABULARY  
Tax rates form a function over the relevant range: income, wages, or 
spending, depending on the base. These rates can be progressive, meaning 
increasing; flat or proportionate; or regressive, meaning decreasing—and, 
indeed, any tax can be all three of these shapes over differing ranges of its 
base. 
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There are two different meanings of ―tax rates.‖ The income tax in the 
United States and most developed nations around the world depends on a 
system of progressive marginal rates that work like a step function. Thus, 
and to simplify, for a family of four there might be a ―zero bracket‖ 
reaching up to $20,000;44 a 15% bracket extending from $20,000 to 
$60,000; and a 30% bracket over that, as presented in table 1: 
 
TABLE 1.  Sample Marginal Rate Schedule 
Income Marginal Tax Rate (%) 
$0–$20,000 0 
$20,000–$60,000 15 
Over $60,000 30 
This means that the family‘s ―first‖ $20,000 is not taxed, and its ―next‖ 
$40,000—the income that takes it from $20,000 to $60,000—is taxed, on 
the margin, at 15%. It does not mean that all of the family‘s income is 
taxed at 15%. So, for example, a family making $40,000 would pay $3000 
in taxes under this simplified rate structure: 0% on its first $20,000, plus 
15% of $40,000 – $20,000. An interesting aside is that virtually all flat-rate 
tax plans that have been proposed in the United States are in fact ―two-rate‖ 
plans, hence featuring progressive marginal rates: the plans typically have 
an exempt level or zero bracket, followed by a positive tax bracket, of 
somewhere between 15% and 30%.45 
Average or (equivalently) effective tax rates, in contrast, equal the total 
taxes paid by a taxpayer divided by his or her total income or other base. 
Using the same simplified example from table 1, a family of four would 
face an average tax rate of 0% on its first $20,000 of income. At $30,000 of 
income, the family would pay $1500 in taxes (15% of $30,000 – $20,000), 
for an average tax rate of 5% ($1500/$30,000); at $40,000, the family 
would pay $3000 in taxes, as calculated above, for an average tax rate of 
7.5% ($3000/$40,000). 
Under a system of progressive marginal rates, average tax rates, after 
 
 44. The U.S. income tax is not completely transparent in its zero bracket, which does not appear 
directly in I.R.C. § 1 (2006), which generally sets out the marginal rate structure. A family‘s range of 
nontaxable income depends on whether the family itemizes (as most families do not), the number of 
personal credits including dependents, and whether the family is subject to the alternative minimum tax. 
See id. §§ 21–26, 55, 161. 
 45. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 25, at 45–46 (proposing a positive tax bracket of 19% after 
an initial exempt level); MCCAFFERY, supra note 40, at 51–53. 
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the initial zero bracket range, keep increasing, asymptotically approaching 
the highest marginal rate as the base goes out to infinity. That is, again in 
the simple example, the taxpayer family will eventually face an average tax 
rate of practically 30% as its income increases, so that the ―benefit‖ of the 
initial 0% and 15% rate brackets becomes a trivial part of the whole. As 
long as the marginal tax rate is higher than the average, the average is 
increasing—the higher marginal tax rate pulling it up. 
B.  ADDING DEMOGRANTS TO THE MIX 
While progressive marginal rates necessarily mean progressive 
average tax rates, the converse does not hold. Progressive average rates can 
also be obtained with a system of proportionate or even declining marginal 
tax rates, as long as the marginal rate exceeds the average. This is an 
important aspect of optimal tax analysis, explained more fully below. The 
idea is easiest to understand together with a common feature of optimal tax 
models: the use of a lump-sum rebate or ―demogrant.‖46  
Consider adding to the simple illustration in table 1 a demogrant of 
$750 per person, or $3000 total for our family of four. With no other 
changes, there would now be negative average tax rates: a family earning 
$10,000, for example, would pay –$3000, because it would get the rebate 
without paying any tax, for an average rate of –30%. The family earning 
$40,000 would net out at a rate of 0%, and so on. Table 2 summarizes, 




 46. The word ―demogrant‖ combines ―demo,‖ or people, and ―grant,‖ in this case money. True 
demogrants must be ―lump-sum,‖ that is, calculated without regard to income. Otherwise they easily 
collapse into combinations of grants and marginal taxes, since grant amounts that decline with income 
have the same features as income taxes. Put another (equivalent) way, lump-sum payments (or taxes) 
have no substitution effects. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1950. 
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TABLE 2.  Average and Marginal Tax Rates with Demogrant 
Family  








$10,000 $0 $3000 –$3000 –30% 0% 
$40,000 $3000 $3000 $0 0% 15% 
$100,000 $18,000 $3000 $15,000 15% 30% 
Suppose finally that we changed the rate structure from table 1 to be a 
flat 20%, but kept the demogrant of table 2 in place. The family at $10,000 
would net out at –$1000, a –10% average tax rate; at $40,000, the family 
would pay a positive $5000, for a 12.5% average tax rate; by $100,000, the 
family would pay $17,000, on net, for a 17% average. Table 3 summarizes: 
 
TABLE 3. Average and Marginal Tax Rates with Demogrant and Flat Tax 
Family  








$10,000 $2000 $3000 –$1000 –10% 20% 
$40,000 $8000 $3000 $5000 12.5% 20% 
$100,000 $20,000 $3000 $17,000 17% 20% 
Under the tax system represented in table 3, there are progressive 
average tax rates without progressive marginal rates. Indeed, the average 
rate for each family in table 3 has gone up compared with table 2, although 
this would not continue to be true for wealthier families. The asymptote for 
table 3 is 20%, compared with table 2, which was at 30%. The insight that 
progressive marginal rates are not needed to obtain progressivity in average 
tax burdens is especially important to optimal tax analysis, where a core 
finding of almost all models is declining marginal tax rates at the upper 
ranges of income.47 
C.  WHAT MATTERS ABOUT RATES? 
Most policy discussions of tax in a welfare economics tradition define 
 
 47. See MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 14 (1990). We discuss 
optimal tax analysis more extensively in Part IV.D. 
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progressivity as referring to average tax rates.48 This definition follows 
simply enough if one is looking at a snapshot of distributive outcomes, 
measuring income (or wages or spending) pre- and posttax. In the fullest 
and most complete statement of optimal tax analysis, as Louis Kaplow has 
forcefully pointed out, all government tax and transfer programs would be 
considered together and aggregated, just as demogrants and marginal tax 
rates are in the classic Mirrlees formulation, and as we did in tables 2 and 
3.49 In more philosophical terms, average rates point to end-state 
distributive justice: the resources people have after all government 
programs are considered.  
In the standard welfarist conception, marginal tax rates matter only for 
their incentive effects at the individual level, that is, for their effects on 
efficiency. In a very crude nutshell, the project for optimal tax, at least 
assuming a redistributive social welfare function, is to generate progressive 
average tax (net tax and transfer) rates while minimizing the marginal 
disincentives to work, especially among the most able. This division of 
labor between the two types of rates ultimately leads to different patterns. 
Marginal rates decline over high ranges, often ending in zero on the highest 
able worker (and sometimes even going negative at the top). Average rates 
tend to increase, however, with demogrants doing the work of ensuring the 
redistributive result.50  
Further investigation, however, suggests that marginal rates can 
matter—both to conceptions of fairness and to efficiency—independent of 
their contribution to average tax rates, once we consider changing the tax 
base along with the rate structure. The basic insight is simple: because 
optimal income tax has developed considering an income or wage tax, 
marginal rates have affected only the decisions to work or save. The 
disincentives generated by high rates lead to a socially inefficient 
substitution of present consumption for saving and leisure for labor. If the 
base is allowed to vary—to include exclusions for charitable contributions, 
 
 48. LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 17 n.7 (2008); LIAM 
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 17 n.* (2002); SLEMROD 
& BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 43; Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1907–08. But cf. Lawrence 
Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX 
L. REV. 51, 56 (1999) (distinguishing between ―average rate progresivity‖ and ―marginal rate 
progresivity‖). 
 49. See Louis Kaplow, Public Goods and the Distribution of Income, 50 EUR. ECON. REV. 1627 
(2006) (requiring that all of the benefits and burdens of all government policies are netted out to get an 
accurate sense of distributional effects). 
 50. For average rates to increase constantly, they must always be below the marginal rate, which 
is not true with a zero (or negative) rate at the highest end.  
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for example, as suggested by Peter Diamond,51 or for saving, as is our 
principal theme here—high marginal tax rates can push people to give to 
charity or to save, as well as or in lieu of engaging in leisure. These 
activities—saving and philanthropy—have very different equity and 
efficiency characteristics than do consumption or leisure. Both 
philanthropy and saving can be seen as public goods, which benefit all. In 
such cases, marginal rates, independent of their influence on average rates, 
can shape matters of concern to both efficiency and fairness advocates.  
This is a different argument than one pressed by others, such as 
Lawrence Zelenak and Kemper Moreland in the legal literature.52 Zelenak 
and Moreland argue that marginal tax rates are relevant because they are 
related to average tax rates, and, in fact, are necessary to achieve any form 
of progressivity in tax once demogrants are ruled out.53 These are 
analytically correct claims: without some kind of demogrant, progressive 
marginal rates are for all practical purposes needed for progressive average 
rates.54 But this is still an argument about average tax rates, given a 
political constraint—no demogrants. We agree that America is unlikely to 
engraft a significant new demogrant onto the existing government spending 
platform, as we discuss below.55 But our argument for the relevance of 
marginal tax rates extends beyond their impact on average tax rates.  
 
 51. Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods with and 
Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 897, 901–03 (2006). 
 52. Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 48. Zelenak and Moreland do a nice job of setting out the 
centrality of average tax rates in other analyses, particularly Bankman and Griffith‘s. See id. at 55–58 
(discussing Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25). They then list as the first reason why marginal rates 
might still matter: the political infeasibility of demogrants. Id. at 60–61. We discuss this argument 
below, in the context of Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel‘s similar argument. See infra note 155 and 
accompanying text. Zelenak and Moreland‘s other reasons why progressive marginal rates might matter 
are that envy might figure into the social welfare function; taxation might serve as insurance against 
wage uncertainty; high-income taxpayers might be more inelastic than generally assumed (a 
qualification also noted by Mirrlees in 1971, see Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 207–08); the distribution of 
abilities in society might differ from the usual assumptions (there is a ―thick‖ upper tail); or there might 
be ―winner take all‖ markets. See Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 48, at 57. These qualifications 
typically fit the standard models and are indeed often made in the literature; they also all come in the 
context of an income or wage tax. Our argument, in contrast, is that society might have reasonable 
concerns over the patterns of behavior of its richest citizens, especially a pattern of unchecked, high-end 
consumption. We develop these arguments next. 
 53. See Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 48, at 56–57. 
 54. Technically, average rates will constantly—monotonically—increase as long as marginal 
rates are above average rates; this could be obtained even with some intervals of declining marginal 
rates. In table 2, for example, imagine that the top marginal rate fell from 30 to 25 percent before the 
average tax rate had obtained 25 percent; we would have at least episodically declining marginal rates 
while steadily increasing average ones.  
 55. See infra Part IX.B.  
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In brief, marginal incentives matter. Obtaining average rate 
progression by maintaining steep marginal rate progression under an 
income or wage tax means sacrificing efficiency—welfare or wealth—to 
obtain equity. This is what politicians, commentators, and ordinary citizens 
have noticed ever since Ronald Reagan‘s presidency—and it is what haunts 
President Obama today.56 Minimizing the tradeoff between efficiency and 
equity is why optimal income tax models accept declining marginal tax 
rates on the upper income. These declining rates can be justified on the 
Paretian principle that it is better for the most able to work than not to 
work.57 But then these declining marginal rates under a wage or income 
tax—reaching zero in many models for the most able58—mean that society 
must sit by and watch as its most highly compensated citizens, at the 
margin, get richer while paying little or no additional taxes, and are free to 
spend what they earn. This pattern is what bothers Zelenak and Moreland, 
along with many, if not most, ordinary citizens.59 The philosophers Liam 
Murphy and Thomas Nagel in their work on tax policy make a similar 
point, which we comment on below.60 Resolving the dispute by insisting on 
progressive marginal rates under an income tax, however, means choosing 
equity over efficiency. Changing the tax base changes the tradeoff.  
D.  A SHORT EXPLORATION OF OPTIMAL TAX THEORY 
We have already introduced the idea of optimal tax, the dominant 
contemporary analytic framework for considering tax rates. It is time to 
explain the idea more fully.  
1.  The Basics 
Beginning with a seminal paper in 1971, Mirrlees famously led the 
development of optimal income tax theory, building on the much earlier 
 
 56. See Leonhardt, supra note 11. 
 57. The Paretian principle, named after the political economist Vilfredo Pareto, stands for the 
idea that society should adopt any change that improves at least one person‘s welfare while harming no 
one‘s. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 54 n.75 (2002). 
 58. Indeed, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz even has an optimal tax model wherein marginal tax 
rates on the most able are negative. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 
17 J. PUB. ECON. 213, 215 (1982). 
 59. See Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 48, at 54–56. For example, Warren Buffett famously 
noted that his own average tax rate was considerably lower than those of his employees, including his 
secretary, and conjectured that the same was true of every other wealthy investor. See David Ellis, 
Buffett Talks Tax Reform with Sen. Clinton, CNNMONEY.COM, June 27, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/26/news/newsmakers/clinton_buffett/index.htm. 
 60. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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optimal commodity tax work of Frank Ramsey.61 Ramsey had 
demonstrated that an optimally efficient government should set differential 
commodity tax rates based on the demand for different goods, generally 
leading to the ―inverse elasticity rule‖ whereby inelastically demanded 
goods should be most highly taxed.62 Mirrlees situated the optimal income 
tax problem in a welfare and information economics setting, analyzing the 
properties of income taxes designed to redistribute income in the most 
efficient possible manner, given the information limits facing 
governments.63 
Importantly, because there is only a single period in Mirrlees‘s model, 
there is no saving.64 All income comes from wages and is spent in the 
single period. This is a wage tax. Taxes generate revenue for the 
government in the model that is simply turned back over to the people via 
demogrants. Given a social welfare function with declining marginal utility 
of money income, a Mirrlees-style model can lead to a large amount of 
redistribution. In a certain limiting case, where taxes have no distorting 
effects, the government would tax all wages and return demogrants to all to 
equalize after-tax wealth. But of course taxes do distort, and therein lies the 
rub.  
The specific problem facing the government in a Mirrlees model is an 
informational one: individuals know their abilities—which, in the model, 
represent their abilities to cash their native talents out into wages—but the 
government cannot observe this information. In the face of high marginal 
tax rates, taxpayers, as the agents to the government‘s principal, might 
―shirk,‖ substituting leisure for labor, earning less, and thereby appearing to 
be, in the government‘s eyes, of lesser ability than they in fact are. This 
formulation is analogous to the perhaps more familiar language of 
―substitution effects.‖ Tax rates distort the allocation of resources, which 
ought, in standard welfare economics theory, to be set efficiently by the 
pretax price system. Looking at wages, or the payment for labor, taxes on 
them cause after-tax wages to fall, and so people find work less attractive. 
This tax-induced distortion causes taxpayers to substitute untaxed leisure 
 
 61. Mirrlees, supra note 17. For further commentary on optimal tax analysis, see 3 Alan J. 
Auerbach & James R. Hines, Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 1347, 1361 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); Bankman & Griffith, supra 
note 25, at 1946–65; and Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public 
Production II: Tax Rules, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1971). 
 62. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 56–57 
(1927). 
 63. See Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 175–76. 
 64.  See id. at 175 (―The economy discussed below is timeless.‖). 
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for taxed labor, all else equal.  
The major implications of the Mirrlees model and its considerable 
progeny65 are that, given a redistributive social welfare function with 
certain restrictions on technology, skills, and individual utility functions, 
the marginal tax rate on labor earnings should (1) attain its peak in the 
middle of the income range and decline at the upper ranges of income for 
workers with high wage-earning ability, and (2) reach zero on the last 
dollar earned by the highest ability wage-earner (though Mirrlees himself 
did not have this top rate of zero).66 While there is great disagreement 
about the precise contours, there is little argument that marginal tax rates 
should decline over the upper income (or ability) range. Matti Tuomala, a 
prominent proponent of the optimal tax tradition, has put it simply that 
―[o]ne of the main conclusions to be drawn from the Mirrleesian optimal 
non-linear income tax model is that it is difficult (if at all possible) to find a 
convincing argument for a progressive marginal rate structure 
throughout.‖67 
Mirrlees included simulations in his seminal 1971 paper that featured 
peak (that is, highest tax rates, typically on the lower-middle income class) 
and highest-end (that is, tax rates for the most able or highest income) 
marginal tax rates of 26 and 16; 21 and 15; 28 and 19; 34 and 20; 39 and 
21; and 60 and 49.68 These peak/highest-end rate pairs show not only the 
considerable range of possible outcomes under an optimal tax analysis 
(depending on the social welfare and individual utility functions used), but 
also the general pattern of peaking then falling. Later analysis pushed the 
case out to finding a zero rate—in the case of one model advanced by 
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, a negative rate—for the highest earner / 
most able citizen.69 In all optimal tax models, progressivity in average tax 
rates is achieved by means of demogrants, combined with the pattern of 
often increasing (over low to middle income ranges), but intermittently 
decreasing (especially over upper income ranges), marginal rates.  
The intuitions behind the complex mathematics of optimal income tax 
models are simple enough to state. The pattern of tax rates once again 
 
 65. For a review of major contributions to the Mirrlees tradition, see Auerbach & Hines, supra 
note 61. 
 66. The zero top marginal rate was first identified by Efraim Sadka, On Income Distribution, 
Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 261, 266 (1976); and J. K. Seade, 
On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 203, 205–06 (1977). 
 67. TUOMALA, supra note 47, at 14. 
 68. Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 202–04 tbls.II, IV, VI, VIII, X & XII. 
 69. Seade, supra note 66, at 205–06 (finding a zero rate); Stiglitz, supra note 58, at 215. 
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reflects the tradeoff between the distorting effects of taxes on labor supply 
decisions on the one hand, and the benefits of producing and then 
redistributing income via the tax system on the other. While higher 
marginal tax rates at low income levels have the undesirable feature of 
discouraging work effort by low-ability taxpayers—one aspect of many of 
the models is that some citizens will rationally chose not to work70—such 
rates also offer the prospect of raising significant tax revenue from all 
taxpayers, including the high-income or high-ability taxpayers, for whom 
the higher rates are inframarginal. That is, the high tax rates on low levels 
of income occur well ―before‖ the high-income or high-ability taxpayers 
make their marginal decisions about additional work effort. If a well-
educated lawyer can earn $250,000 a year, for example, her marginal work 
decisions—should she work those extra hours toward the end of the year to 
get a larger bonus, say—are unlikely to be affected by a high marginal rate 
on her first $50,000 of income. Higher rates on the lower and middle 
income brackets raise money from all or most taxpayers, which the 
government can then redistribute to all citizens, including the poor, via 
demogrants.  
High marginal tax rates at upper incomes and abilities, in contrast, 
while they also distort the labor supply of high-income or high-ability 
taxpayers, raise only modest amounts of revenue because they apply only 
to a small fraction of the labor force. Unless the labor supply of the rich is 
unusually unresponsive to taxes, that is, inelastic—and the opposite is 
likely to be the case—tax rates applying to upperincome levels attempt to 
tax what is a very elastic and a very small base. Hence optimal income 
taxation entails declining marginal tax rates over the upper ranges of the 
income distribution. Suppose that our well-paid lawyer faces a 90 percent 
rate on any earnings over her $250,000 pay. Would she work those extra 
hours, giving up time with family and friends in order to keep 10 cents on 
the dollar? In the limiting case, it is better—for all, under the standard 
Paretian condition—for a worker to work than not to work simply for tax 
reasons, hence the zero tax rate on the last dollar earned by the otherwise 
fully-deterred highest potential wage earner. Another way to express the 
same concept is that there is nothing for society to gain by imposing a 
positive marginal tax rate on the most able worker, thereby distorting his or 
her labor supply, since such taxes yield no greater revenue than less 
distorting alternatives. It is always better to eliminate the taxation of the 
 
 70. See KAPLOW, supra note 48, at 69 n.24; Kaplow, supra note 49, at 1629–30; Mirrlees, supra 
note 17, at 207; Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive 
Labor Supply Responses, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1051–52 (2002). 
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last dollar earned by the most affluent taxpayer, paying for this reduction 
by increasing the taxation of income just below that level, since doing so 
creates fewer labor market distortions.  
2.  Qualifications, Questions, and Caveats 
That is the basic framework for optimal income tax analysis, which 
has been highly influential in the academy and beyond. There are several 
important qualifications.  
One, optimal tax models are extremely sensitive to changes in key 
assumptions and parameters, as the simulations from Mirrlees‘s initial 
article itself suggest. The most important variable in a public policy setting 
is labor supply elasticity. This is typically found to be low for men,71 at 
least, suggesting that tax rates can be higher than some models would 
otherwise suggest.72 In the face of this empirical observation, the literature 
has generally shifted from the elasticity of labor income per se to the 
elasticity of taxable income.73 Here, scholars have typically found more 
dramatic effects, suggesting that while people may continue to work in the 
 
 71.  This fact raises puzzling questions about why we do not have better mechanisms to lower the 
taxable burden on women, especially married women, who typically register higher labor supply 
elasticities, but we leave that puzzle for another day. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 
267–69 (1997). 
 72. See, e.g., 4 Alan B. Krueger & Bruce D. Meyer, Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance, in 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 61, at 2327, 2384–85 (estimating that ―the labor supply 
elasticities typically found for men in studies of the effects of wages or taxes on hours of work . . . are 
centered close to zero‖). One interesting quirk of the literature is that most of the studies of labor supply 
elasticities look at ―uncompensated‖ elasticities: that is, how labor supply responds to a change in the 
after-tax wage. In standard welfare economics, however, economists look to compensated elasticities. 
The difference arises because any tax has two effects. One, the substitution effect, alluded to above in 
the text, arises because the tax affects the price, and thus leads to a substitution away from higher priced 
goods or activities. But taxes also take money away from taxpayers, leading to the second effect, the 
income effect. Because individuals need income, they might work more in the face of a tax on wages. A 
―compensated‖ elasticity corrects for the income effect, to look at the distortion caused by the 
substitution effect alone. An uncompensated elasticity, in contrast, looks at the real behavior, the 
amalgam of income and substitution effects. This can often be low, because the two effects roughly 
cancel each other out, although there can be a high utility loss from the tax. Interestingly, although a 
strong case can be made that economists should look to compensated elasticities, the government, as an 
institution concerned with real revenues, would typically look to uncompensated elasticities. Hence 
uncompensated elasticity may, in fact, be the more relevant variable for ―everyday optimal tax‖ theory.  
 73. Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The 
Implications of Evasion and Avoidance, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL‘Y 31, 31 (2009); Martin Feldstein, 
Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 674, 679 (1999) 
[hereinafter Feldstein, Tax Avoidance]; Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable 
Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551, 551–52 (1995) [hereinafter 
Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates]. 
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face of high tax rates, they devote more time and effort to shielding their 
income from tax.74 This can, of course, be a ―bad‖ thing, if the shifts are to 
illegal noncompliance or to socially distorting decisions, such as the 
substitution of untaxed capital income for taxable ordinary wages.75 But the 
shift can also be a ―good‖ thing if the reason for the diminished labor effect 
of high marginal tax rates is that taxpayers are responding to socially 
beneficial incentives in the tax law—such as by making charitable 
contributions, as suggested by Diamond,76 or via a generalized saving 
incentive, as developed in the central insight of this Article. 
Two, and more particularly, there is considerable disagreement about 
how general the Mirrlees results are and what the precise details should 
be—where, exactly, the marginal rate should begin to decline and where (if 
at all) it should reach zero. For example, in a 1998 article, Diamond reports 
that the top marginal rate does not reach zero in his model with a bounded 
distribution of individual types.77 Later scholars have argued that 
Diamond‘s result follows from the very particular form of the utility 
function that Diamond (and some subsequent authors) adopted for 
modeling convenience.78 In a 1982 article, Stiglitz showed that the top 
income tax rate can be negative in a setting in which labor of different 
types is not perfectly substitutable.79 There are yet other generalizations of 
the basic Mirrlees result, in a flourishing optimum income tax literature.80  
Three, the optimal tax analysis in its classic incarnation depends 
crucially on demogrants. Without demogrants, average tax rates cannot 
increase over significant ranges with declining marginal tax rates. The 
difficulty is that demogrants are unlikely to happen on any scale—and 
certainly not on the scale countenanced by the optimal tax models—any 
time soon, or perhaps ever.81 We nonetheless draw significantly different 
analytic conclusions from this apparent fact than have others, as we discuss 
below. 
 
 74. See, e.g., Chetty, supra note 73, at 45–46; Feldstein, Tax Avoidance, supra note 73, at 674. 
 75. See Chetty, supra note 73, at 45–46; Wojciech Kopczuk, Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the 
Elasticity of Reported Income, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 2093, 2095 (2005); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation 
and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 171–74 (1990). 
 76. See Diamond, supra note 51, at 901–03. 
 77. Peter A. Diamond, Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of 
Optimal Marginal Tax Rates, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 83, 93 (1998). 
 78. See, e.g., Momi Dahan & Michel Strawczynski, Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with 
a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 681, 681 (2000). 
 79. Stiglitz, supra note 58, at 215. 
 80. For surveys of these works, see KAPLOW, supra note 48, 53–79; Auerbach & Hines, supra 
note 61. 
 81. See infra Part IX.B.  
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Four, it is worth noting that there is certain angst even within the 
optimal tax literature that important variables might be missing. Mirrlees 
himself, at the conclusion of his 1971 article, reflected that he would 
―hesitate to apply the conclusions regarding individuals of high skill,‖ 
because he surmised that, ―apart from the possibilities of migration,‖ the 
highly able find that ―their work is, up to a point, quite attractive,‖ and are 
thus inelastic.82 This is surmise on Mirrlees‘s part, explicitly wishful 
thinking. Mirrlees felt compelled to qualify his speculation with the phrases 
―up to a point‖ and the ―possibilities of migration.‖ Mirrlees was clearly 
not thinking at the level of detail of substituting nontaxable for taxable 
income, where a high elasticity is plausible (that is, taxpayers are likely to 
respond highly to incentives to shelter income from taxes when tax rates 
are high). Mirrlees concluded that ―[t]he income-tax is a much less 
effective tool for reducing inequalities than has often been thought,‖ and 
ended his article sounding a plaintive plea for the ―great desirability of 
finding some effective method of offsetting the unmerited favours that 
some of us receive from our genes and family advantages.‖83 
Finally, it bears stressing that the optimal income tax has been 
developed in the context of an income tax base, which is, indeed, a wage 
base in Mirrlees‘s precise formulation, because there is no time and hence 
no saving. The central point of this Article is that the project of choosing 
optimal tax rates must be connected to the project of choosing a tax base.  
V.  BASE-RATE PAIRS: A NEW LOOK 
We now combine the discussion of bases and rates to consider base-
rate pairs. Because our project considers the case for progressivity in tax—
specifically more steeply progressive marginal as well as average tax 
rates—we consider three pairs: progressive income, wage, and spending 
taxes. As explained above, the equivalence of wage and spending taxes, a 
key plank in the traditional income-versus-consumption tax debate, holds 
only for regimes without uncertainty and then only for essentially flat 
taxes. The three bases differ under progressive rates. We must consider 
each, especially as to how each affects saving, the critical difference among 
the bases.84  
 
 82. Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 207–08. 
 83. Id. at 208. 
 84. The tax bases under progressive marginal rates also differ in how they affect uneven flows: 
progressive income and wage taxes burden ―lumpy‖ or uneven earnings relative to even earnings, 
whereas progressive spending taxes are neutral as to the timing of earnings but burden ―lumpy‖ or 
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To review, an income tax double taxes all saving, whatever the source 
and use of the savings, by design. A wage tax exempts all saving, again 
whatever the source and use, again by design. A progressive spending tax 
splits the difference, taxing some but not all uses of savings. To understand 
this point, and to get a sense of how to characterize the saving that a 
progressive spending tax does and does not tax, we need a better 
understanding of the uses of savings. 
A.  THREE USES OF SAVINGS  
Consider in financial terms how most of us live out our lifetimes. As 
any parent knows, we spring forth into the world nearly fully formed as 
consumers: we cost money from the get-go. But (as any parent also knows) 
we do not earn anything for quite some time. When we do start earning, it 
is necessary to earn more than we spend to pay off the debts of youth, 
including school loans, and then to set aside funds for retirement so that we 
do not have to work all the days of our lives. Our time on earth looks like 
one fairly steady consumption profile, from cradle to grave, financed by a 
lumpy period of labor market earnings concentrated in midlife.  
If we lived as islands, by ourselves, we would have to balance the 
books on our own account, borrowing in youth, first paying off debts and 
later saving for retirement in midlife, spending down in old age. Financial 
intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies would facilitate this 
process. In reality, many families work more or less as informal annuities 
markets, across generations.85 Our parents pay for our spending in youth, 
and we pay for our children‘s youths; we also stand ready to pay our 
parents back, should their needs exceed their resources in old age, and so 
on. 
The figure below is meant to be a very simple picture of this pattern. 
The curved line indicates earnings from work. The horizontal lines 
represent spending. The lower, solid horizontal line is a crude 
approximation of a fully self-financed taxpayer, whose lifetime spending 
equals (in present value terms) his or her lifetime earnings. The dotted line 
represents a taxpayer who has been able to live ―better‖—a more expensive 
lifestyle—than his or her labor earnings alone, smoothed across time, 
would seem to allow.  
 
 
uneven spending. See McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 873–78.  
 85. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak, The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market, 89 
J. POL. ECON. 372, 388–89 (1981). 
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FIGURE.  Earnings and Spending Across Time 
 
 
In this perhaps atypical characterization of a typical life, note three 
broad uses of savings. One is to smooth out consumption profiles within 
lifetimes or across individuals—to translate uneven labor market earnings 
into level consumption flows. We do this by borrowing in youth and saving 
for retirement in midlife.86 We can do this using third-party financial 
intermediaries or by borrowing and saving within the family. Economists 
call this use of savings ―life cycle savings.‖87  
A second use of savings is to provide for periods of emergency, such 
as heightened medical or educational needs, or times of low income due to 
un- or underemployment. These are exceptional needs, off the usual plan 
 
 86. Note that a spending tax consistently subtracts saving, under the simple formula (a 
rearrangement of the Haig-Simons definition), Consumption = Income – Saving. This means that a 
spending tax will include debt within its base as a form of negative saving. Debt that is used to save 
ends up being a ―wash‖: an inclusion qua debt minus a deduction qua saving. But debt that is used to 
finance spending is taxed currently. This feature may sound odd, but it need not. Consider a basic sales 
tax: you pay this tax when you buy an item on credit, as with a credit card; you do not pay the tax again 
when you pay off your credit card balance. So too, debt to finance personal spending is within a 
spending tax base; repayments of principal debt, which in fact reflect positive saving, are not. Students 
and others often consider that this feature means a progressive spending tax will hurt them. In fact, 
allowing the tax to come due in the period of spending lowers average tax rates across a lifetime for 
students, under progressive rates, compared to the income tax treatment of ignoring both debt and its 
repayment. Note also that borrowing under a progressive spending tax works like retirement savings in 
reverse: it pulls down the level being taxed. For a more detailed discussion, see McCaffery, A New 
Understanding, supra note 23, at 878–80. 
 87. See Franco Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the 
Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 15, 16–17 (1988); Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, 
Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST-
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for living shown in the figure. Economists call this use of savings 
―precautionary savings.‖88 Such savings are significant in our analysis 
because provisions in the tax‘s base may carve out the attendant uses for 
lower or even no taxation; we return to this theme below as another 
application of the significance of viewing bases and rates in conjunction. 
This then leaves as a third use of savings essentially all else, the 
analytic complement of smoothing: capital transactions can shift 
consumption profiles, up or down. An upward shift occurs when the fruits 
of our own or another‘s (via beneficence) savings allow us to live a ―better‖ 
lifestyle than we could on the basis of our own labor market earnings, 
alone, smoothed out over time. Suppose that we inherited wealth, or got 
lucky in the capital markets and made a high return on our investments 
(received windfalls), as Warren Buffet or Bill Gates: our spending could 
increase. This scenario is what the dotted line in the figure illustrates. A 
downward shift occurs when our own beneficence or bad fortune means 
that we will live at a lower lifestyle than we otherwise could, again on the 
basis of our smoothed-out labor market earnings profile alone.  
Economists tend not to have a handy phrase for this type of shifting 
transaction, in part because the issue has not arisen under the traditional 
income-versus-consumption tax debate. Economists write instead about 
―bequest savings,‖ by which they mean private capital handed over to the 
next generation.89 This phrase does not necessarily get at the ex ante 
motivation for such saving, and ex ante motivations are key to 
understanding the possible incentive effects of various tax regimes. 
Individuals may be saving for life cycle or precautionary reasons and 
simply end up with leftover funds to pass on—what some economists call 
―accidental bequests.‖90 Others, as we discuss below, may actively desire 
to leave bequests to their heirs or to save for charity, or they may simply 
get a consumption value from owning stores of capital.  
We will use both the standard economics vocabulary of savings and 
our own terminology of shifting and smoothing. The traditional breakdown 
of life cycle / precautionary / bequest does not distinguish between 
smoothing and shifting savings within a lifetime. Smoothing reflects an 
ordinary yield to capital and the use of savings to even out typically uneven 
 
 88. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, John Shoven & Avia Spivak, Annuity Insurance, Savings, and 
Inequality, in LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 109, 109 (1989). 
 89. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, in LAURENCE J. 
KOTLIKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS?, supra note 88, at 68, 81–83. 
 90. See Wojciech Kopczuk, Economics of Estate Taxation: Review of Theory and Evidence, 63 
TAX L. REV. 139, 145 (2009). 
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earnings from the labor market. Shifting, in an upward direction, refers to 
those extraordinary returns, as well as bequests and inheritances, that tend 
to characterize the lifestyles of the rich, such as Warren Buffet and Bill 
Gates: these fortunate few are living better than they could be on the basis 
of their labor earnings alone, narrowly defined, spread over time at normal 
interest rates. Hence we use the vocabulary of 
smoothing/precautionary/shifting. These terms ultimately account for all 
uses of capital, distinguish between smoothing and shifting 
intragenerationally, and work perfectly well intergenerationally as well: 
capital passed between generations can be used to smooth out familial 
spending patterns, provide for emergencies, or enable later generations to 
live more expensive lifestyles than they otherwise could (that is, to shift 
up). Most important, smoothing transactions lower the burden of taxation 
under progressive marginal spending rates, whereas upward shifts increase 
such burdens, as we continue to explore below. 
B.  BASES AND SAVINGS 
Under progressive marginal rates, a tax is constantly increasing in the 
base: that is, the tax rate is rising on the implicit y-axis in the figure. Now 
we can see, visually, that the three tax systems—income, wage, and 
spending—affect patterns of work, saving, and spending differently.  
Both income and wage taxes, as source-based taxes, apply to the 
curved earnings line in the figure. Thus, both penalize taxpayers with 
uneven earnings—highly educated professionals, for example, who must 
wait while their education progresses to earn back their keep, and then have 
a period of high earnings concentrated in midlife.91 Further, an income tax 
double taxes all saving, come what may. An ideal income tax would add to 
the tax on wages—reflected in the curved line—a second tax on the yield to 
the saving needed to smooth labor earnings out into retirement. An income 
tax would also double tax all precautionary saving and burden taxpayers 
who had to borrow, as for their education, in their youth. 
A wage tax also falls on all current labor effort. It has the same 
problem with ―lumpy‖ earnings as does an income tax. But a wage tax 
simply ignores all capital transactions, again whatever their use. It does 
nothing to get at upward shifts, whereby certain taxpaying citizens can live 
a better lifestyle than their labor market earnings alone support. Bill Gates 
 
 91. For a discussion of William Vickrey‘s lifetime averaging, see McCaffery, A New 
Understanding, supra note 23, at 880–84. 
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and Warren Buffet would pay little or nothing under a wage tax today. 
A progressive spending tax, which is a uses-based tax, in contrast, 
differentiates among uses of savings. Such a tax falls on the straight line—
solid or dotted depending on whether the taxpayer received extra wealth to 
shift his or her lifestyle upward—in the figure. Smoothing saving under a 
progressive spending tax lowers the burden of taxation, compared to 
nonsaving, because it moves material resources, income, from a period of 
high earnings into a period of a lower level of spending. So too, 
precautionary saving—presuming that the precautionary use, such as for 
medical or educational needs, is tax-favored, somehow—also brings down 
the level of taxation. These uses of savings are taxed more like a wage tax, 
and less like an income tax. Upward shifts, in contrast, increase the level of 
tax, measured off the baseline of the smoothed consumption pattern. The 
taxpayer living out the dotted line in the figure is paying a higher effective 
tax under a spending tax than the taxpayer living out the solid line. It does 
not matter how, exactly, the extra spending occurred: through luck in the 
capital markets, successfully disguising labor as capital, or someone else‘s 
beneficence. All that matters is higher material consumption. These 
materially lifestyle-enhancing uses of savings are taxed like an income tax, 
not like a wage tax, which would ignore them. In other words, a 
progressive spending tax burdens the yield to capital when this yield is 
used to finance a greater material lifestyle, but not when that yield is used 
to smooth out labor market earnings or for tax-favored emergencies. 
C.  A HINT OF NORMATIVITY  
The analytics hint at a normative position. Perhaps we are, indeed, of 
two minds about the taxation of saving. Society sometimes wants to tax the 
yield to financial capital, Mill be damned. But other times it does not: 
sympathetic to the Ants of the world, we want to avoid an antisaving bias, a 
double-tax sting. Society may even want to encourage certain types of 
saving, while reserving the right to impose a higher tax burden on those 
fortunate few living off the yield to capital.  
It makes intuitive sense that one would want to tax saving, in the spirit 
of redistribution and fairness, when the yield to capital allows individuals 
to live better, in material terms: the case of upward shifts. It similarly 
makes sense that one would not want to burden saving with a double-tax 
sting when an individual is simply moving around, in constant present-
value terms, her labor market earnings, or is prudently providing for some 
emergency: the cases of smoothing and precautionary savings.  
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Note that these are norms about the uses of savings: they are not 
norms about where the yield came from, whether it be from stocks or 
bonds, farms or small businesses, and so on. These are quite general norms, 
applying to most people in the course of their financial lives. We term the 
two norms the ―yield-to-capital‖ norm, which holds that the yield to capital 
is an element of value that ought to be taxed, and the ―ordinary-savings 
norm,‖ which holds that the use of savings in the ordinary course of a 
typical life, for retirement or certain urgent uses and needs, ought not be 
double taxed.92 When we put the two norms together, we in essence 
subtract out smoothing and precautionary savings, the domain of the 
ordinary-savings norm, from all of savings, the domain of the yield-to-
capital norm, leaving what we have called shifting savings as the item 
being taxed. This would operate both intra- and intergenerationally: capital 
that finances enhanced lifestyles, whether it be own-generation or that of an 
heir, will bear a positive burden of taxation under progressive spending tax 
rates. A consistent progressive spending tax effects this result by design.  
A final note on the two norms just articulated: the current tax system 
reflects just such norms, in its theoretical commitment to double taxing all 
saving, by means of the choice of an income tax (the yield-to-capital 
norm), combined with the plethora of exceptions for smoothing and 
precautionary savings, as in the provisions for retirement accounts, or 
medical or educational savings accounts (the ordinary-savings norm). 
VI.  THE LIMITS OF ―HYBRIDS‖ 
We pause in the ongoing analysis of tax base-rate pairs to consider the 
subject of ―hybrid‖ income-consumption tax bases, now joined by the 
comments on the taxation of saving. Given that society may quite plausibly 
have mixed and even conflicting thoughts and moral intuitions about taxing 
saving, it may appear as if some kind of mixed solution, between the 
income tax‘s double tax and the consumption tax‘s presumed utter 
nontaxation of saving, is the appropriate choice for comprehensive tax 
policy. Thus, indeed, the current tax has come to be known by tax policy 
experts as a ―hybrid‖ income-consumption tax.93  
The first difficulty is in sorting out precisely what a ―hybrid‖ tax 
 
 92. Id. at 860–61. 
 93. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, supra note 24, at 1120; 
Michael S. Knoll, Designing a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1792 (1994); 
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 
1152–55 (1992). 
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means. There are three possibilities. 
First, ―hybrid‖ can refer to a single comprehensive tax—
paradigmatically the current U.S. income tax—containing within itself 
aspects of both an income and a consumption tax. This is how the term is 
most commonly used in the tax policy literature. The income tax today has 
both wage and spending tax provisions—prepaid and postpaid consumption 
tax elements—designed to favor saving by avoiding the income tax‘s 
double-tax burden. Traditional Individual Retirement Accounts (―IRAs‖) 
work on the spending tax model: no tax is paid now, when sums are 
contributed, only later, when the value is withdrawn, presumably to be 
spent.94 The initial deduction for savings follows the simple logic of the 
Haig-Simons definition of Consumption, as Income – Saving, just as the 
more general progressive spending tax does. In addition to IRAs, 
traditional 401(k) plans work this way. In contrast, ―Roth‖ IRAs work on 
the wage-tax model; there is no deduction up front, but the accounts, 
properly maintained, are free from all further taxation.95 Such treatment is 
the preferred means for a growing trend of tax-favored provisions, as in the 
recently introduced Roth 401(k)s, the special educational savings plans 
blessed by I.R.C. § 529, medical savings accounts, and so on. 
The trouble is that this type of hybrid, aside from being oxymoronic—
an income tax that exempts the yield to capital is not an income tax—is 
also incoherent and counterproductive. There is, for example, no reason 
why a mishmosh of income, wage, and spending tax provisions would 
result in any new saving at all.  
Consider first an income-plus-spending tax, as with the traditional 
IRA structure under the income tax. An income tax does not include debt 
within its base: borrowing is literally outside the Haig-Simons definition of 
Income, as the asset of cash is offset by the liability of the obligation to 
repay, such that there is no change in one‘s net wealth when one borrows.96 
A taxpayer can put money into a traditional IRA with one hand, generating 
a tidy tax deduction, and borrow with the other hand, resulting in no net 
saving but plenty of consumption.97 Why might a taxpayer do such a thing? 
 
 94. See I.R.C. § 408 (2006). 
 95. See id. § 408A. 
 96. See McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 827–29, 878–80. 
 97. See Edward J. McCaffery, Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform, in 
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 41, at 455, 473–74 
[hereinafter McCaffery, Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform]; Edward J. McCaffery, 
Good Hybrids/Bad Hybrids, 107 TAX NOTES 1699, 1701–02 (2005); Roger Gordon, Laura 
Kalambokidis & Joel Slemrod, Do We Now Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?, 88 J. 
PUB. ECON. 981, 982–87, 1000–01 (2004) (analyzing the ability of the tax system to collect revenue 
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Presumably because he or she is myopic, eager to spend now and hesitant 
to save. In other words, the very traits leading many supporters to propose 
traditional IRAs are the traits likely to undercut the efficacy of the plan. It 
is, after all, a fact of the matter that the era of IRAs, begun in the 1970s, has 
featured rising consumer debt and declining American saving rates.98 
Consider next an income-plus-wage tax, as derives from the 
increasingly common Roth-style IRAs and savings accounts. These plans 
offer no current benefit for new savers, who get no cash-flow relief today, 
because there is no immediate deduction for the saving. This lack of current 
benefit is thus no help at all to the middle classes struggling to save for 
ordinary-saving reasons, such as for their retirement or extraordinary 
medical or education needs. The Roth-style savings plans also have no 
mechanism to assure that ―old‖ capital is not simply moved into the wage-
tax model accounts.  
In sum, hybrid income-consumption taxes breed complexity and 
confusion while offering little relief to new savers and no enduring 
incentives for new saving.  
The second possibility is that ―hybrid‖ might mean alternative 
comprehensive tax bases running side by side, as we in fact have in the 
United States with the payroll and income tax systems, or as Michael 
Graetz (and others) have proposed with a value-added tax (―VAT‖) 
replacing the income tax for those of relatively modest incomes.99 We have 
no objections, in principle or otherwise, to any of a number of taxes raising 
revenue from most workers/taxpayers. For people who do not save, or do 
not save much, income equals consumption, after all, and the choice of a 
tax base and system for the masses might best be made out on transaction 
costs grounds.100 This second sense of hybrid is not incoherent and 
counterproductive, as was the first, and most common, sense. But this 
Article is about finding the last best hope for progressivity in tax, if there is 
such a thing. A hybrid tax system that combines a VAT, sales, or wage tax 
for the masses is still left with the question of what kind of tax to have for 
 
from capital taxation in the presence of various ―tax arbitrage‖ possibilities involving the use of debt). 
 98. Elizabeth Bell, Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, Retirement Saving Incentives and 
Personal Saving, 105 TAX NOTES 1689, 1689 (2004).  
 99. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND 
COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 200–01 (2008); Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million 
Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 282–83 (2002). A 
VAT is essentially a sales tax, with a tax being added at each stage of a manufacturing and production 
process, such that the ultimate price paid by consumers includes a tax on the full before-tax price. 
 100. Slemrod, supra note 75, at 157. 
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high-income or high-ability taxpayers. A highly progressive income or 
wage tax on these fortunate few will be difficult to obtain, for reasons we 
have pressed throughout. 
This then leaves the third possibility, a progressive spending tax as a 
hybrid: a possibility that few seem to have considered. Yet this is precisely 
what such a tax base-rate pair is, if by ―hybrid‖ we mean a tax that 
sometimes does, and sometimes does not, tax the yield to capital. A 
progressive spending tax, as the prior part illustrated, allows some uses of 
savings—smoothing or life cycle and precautionary—to lower taxes, 
whereas savings used to finance greater material lifestyles, via shifting, 
raise the burden of tax. This is, or can be, as we shall argue below, the most 
logical, principled, and attractive hybrid tax system to consider.  
VII.  THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE SOURCE-BASED 
TAXES 
A progressive marginal rate, source-based tax—income or wage—is 
swimming against the tides of both economic theory and popular opinion. 
We can discern this conclusion on both optimal tax grounds, where we 
recall Mirrlees‘s own lament that ―[t]he income tax is a much less effective 
tool for reducing inequalities than has often been thought,‖101 and on not-
unrelated political-rhetorical grounds.  
To begin, we can group together both wage and income taxes and 
consider primarily the former. An income tax, after all, is a wage tax with a 
second tax on saving engrafted onto it. If the case for steeply progressive 
rates under a wage tax is weak, it is unlikely that a steeply progressive 
income tax would be appealing in theory. Indeed, the most common 
analysis of the taxation of saving in an optimal income tax framework 
suggests a zero rate of capital taxation.102 The most common flat-tax plan, 
 
 101. Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 208. 
 102. See, e.g., Christophe Chamley, Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium 
with Infinite Lives, 54 ECONOMETRICA 607, 619 (1986); Kenneth L. Judd, Redistributive Taxation in a 
Simple Perfect Foresight Model, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 59, 81 (1985). But see Mikhail Golosov, Narayana 
Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 569, 
575–78 (2003) (criticizing Christophe Chamley‘s and Kenneth Judd‘s analyses on zero-rate capital 
taxation); Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski & Ivan Werning, New Dynamic Public Finance: A User’s 
Guide, 21 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 317, 317 (2006) (same). To show the underdeterminacy of 
optimal tax analysis, as well as its sometimes starkly counterintuitive findings, note that a recent trend 
in dynamic optimal tax analysis has been to support a very high tax on saving. See Golosov, 
Kocherlakota & Tsyvinski, supra; Golosov, Tsyvinski & Werning, supra; Emmanuel Saez, Optimal 
Progressive Capital Income Taxes in the Infinite Horizon Model (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9046, 2002). The intuition behind this result is in part motivated by the idea that it 
DO NOT DELETE 9/30/2010 3:06 PM 
2010] THE LAST BEST HOPE FOR PROGRESSIVITY IN TAX 1069 
  
 
owing to Hall-Rabushka, is in fact for a flat ―income‖ tax with no taxation 
of capital: a wage tax. In practice, as we explain further in Part IX, the so-
called income tax in the United States is largely a wage tax. Mirrlees 
himself, in modeling an ―optimal income tax,‖ chose to make it into a wage 
tax by having but a single period in his model.103 But a wage tax is limited 
in its ability to bear significant progressivity. 
In a crude nutshell, we never need get very far beyond a popular 
instinct that the government should tax ―bads‖ not ―goods.‖ When it comes 
to broad-based taxes such as the income tax or any likely alternative, the 
language of ―goods‖ and ―bads‖ is surely too simplistic and blunt, so we 
can use the phrases ―socially productive‖ and ―private-regarding‖ in their 
stead. Work and saving are socially productive; they increase the size of the 
celebrated social pie. Since government policies—including taxation, 
regulation, and expenditures—make work and saving generally 
underprovided for as compared to a hypothetical no-tax state, marginal 
contributions to work and saving are preferable, on collective welfarist 
grounds, to their complements, leisure and consumption. By directly taxing 
work and saving, wage and income taxes discourage individuals from 
partaking in these activities. Because society might especially want the 
work effort of the most highly able, the case for declining marginal tax 
rates under optimal income or wage tax analysis is straightforward. 
That simple fact limits how progressive, in marginal as well as 
average rate terms, a source-based tax can be. Note that Mirrlees‘s own 
lament about the redistributive capabilities of an income tax came after he 
had modeled the problem using demogrants to transfer resources back to 
the poor.104 As we discuss more fully in Part IX, America does not have a 
general program of cash grants back to all, and is unlikely to engraft such a 
program onto a status quo in which government spending already exceeds 
government revenue and has been notoriously ―sticky‖ or hard to cut.105 
 
is easier for those with stores of financial capital to adjust their labor supplies in response to steep wage 
or income tax rates because, if necessary, they can resort to living off of their savings. To prevent tax 
avoidance of this form, and thereby to permit the government to impose a broader range of tax rates, 
certain dynamic optimal tax models would tax private capital highly and discourage subsequent capital 
accumulation. See Chamley, supra, at 616 (discussing the possibility of a confiscatory tax on saving in 
the initial period: ―The policy is either to tax as much as possible or not at all‖). However attractive its 
properties in certain optimal tax frameworks, this is not a politically viable option in the United States. 
We thank Jeff Strnad for discussing the literature and analysis with us.  
 103. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 105. Cf. James R. Hines, Jr. & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect, 9 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 217, 217–18 (1995) (discussing congressional revenue sharing in 1835 when the federal 
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Even if we were to create a massive program of pure redistribution, it is 
apparent that it simply could not be funded strictly by tax increases on the 
most able.106 These high-ability sorts are too few, and their labor decisions 
too elastic, to bear the burden. As long as we have wage taxes, we are 
going to have relatively flat, likely declining, marginal tax rates. As long as 
we have limited or no demogrants, the same goes for average tax rates, 
because we are left without the two best mechanisms for average rate 
progressivity: demogrants and marginal rate progression. 
These are not simply abstract claims. At least since the time of Ronald 
Reagan‘s presidency, a political and rhetorical argument against high tax 
rates on high-ability taxpayers has been powerfully made in the public 
culture by such advocates as Martin Feldstein and, in the 2008 presidential 
election campaign, Joe the Plumber. The progressivity of the U.S. income 
tax has fallen since 1980. Recall that the journalist David Leonhardt 
observed that ―even liberal economists‖ had come to view the pre-Reagan 
top marginal tax rates of 70 percent—themselves a significant drop from 
the 90 percent bracket in place from World War II through 1963—as 
unreasonably high.107 As we noted in Part I, the debate between Senators 
Obama and McCain, as played out in the real-world politics of the Obama 
Administration, is over restoring the top marginal tax rate, on individuals 
earning over $250,000, to 39.6 percent from its current 35 percent, and it is 
far from clear that this restoration will happen as we write. Simply put, it is 
highly unlikely that we will ever see a return to significantly progressive 
tax rates under an income or wage tax.  
VIII.  THE EASIER CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE SPENDING TAXES 
Changing from a source-based tax, namely an income or a wage tax, 
to a uses-based spending tax offers the last best hope for returning to 
significant marginal rate progressivity in tax. The reason for this is 
straightforward. Whereas a wage tax deters work and an income tax deters 
work and saving, a progressive spending tax deters, in the first instance, 
only spending. If all people work only to be able to spend, and in the 
present period no less, there will be no difference between income, wage, 
and spending taxes: Income = Consumption + Saving, so if Saving = 0, all 
three taxes are the same.  
But this equivalency is not generally the case: people, especially the 
 
government‘s budget was in surplus and there was no federal debt). 
 106. Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates, supra note 73, at 570. 
 107. See Leonhardt, supra note 11. 
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high-income and wealthy, do save. This means that they do not spend all 
that they can, nonconsumption being the same thing, analytically, as 
saving.  
A key technical question for optimal spending tax analysis concerns 
what the labor-supply elasticity of marginal spending tax rates is. There are 
also capital-supply elasticities to the marginal spending tax rate to consider, 
to pick up the effects of the saving-spending decision. In other words, what 
is the effect on today‘s work (or saving) effort of tomorrow‘s high 
spending tax rates? This is largely a question for an ambitious new research 
agenda, one that has not generally been pursued in part because of the 
confusion in the traditional income-versus-consumption tax debate,108 and 
in part because of simple inertia—scholars tend to study what we have. We 
sketch out this agenda more fully in Part X; the present part discusses a 
number of reasons why the labor supply effect of high marginal tax rates 
under a spending tax might be muted. 
A.  A NOTE ON A PARALLEL 
We want first to mark an important parallel to work by Peter 
Diamond, a prominent public finance economist and leading light in the 
optimal tax tradition. In a 2006 journal article, Diamond argued that 
optimal tax analysis could better support higher marginal tax rates under an 
income tax with a deduction for charitable contributions than under an 
income tax without the deduction.109 Characteristically, Diamond‘s 
analysis is mathematically complex and subject to various particular 
specifications. The core insights revolve around the following ideas: (1) for 
the philanthropically minded, the option of giving to charity dampens the 
effects of high marginal tax rates on labor; and (2) the philanthropic 
contributions themselves are public goods, benefiting the wider society—
unlike the leisure that is the only behavioral response to a high marginal tax 
rate under a pure income or wage tax. 
Diamond‘s paper concerned a modification to the tax base. The same 
argument could well apply to other base exclusions, such as lower or even 
zero rates on medical or educational uses under a spending tax. These uses 
correspond to the category of precautionary savings noted above. In short, 
 
 108. We are aware of just one draft asking a related question in an experimental context. See 
Tomer Blumkin, Bradley J. Ruffle & Yosef Ganun, Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really 
Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods (CESIFO, Working Paper No. 
2194, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1079784. 
 109. See Diamond, supra note 51, at 901–03. 
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if a taxpayer is saving in order to provide for future medical or educational 
needs, the taxpayer will rationally calculate that he or she faces a lower, or 
even zero, rate of taxation on the labor supply effort that goes into those 
savings. Thus the anticipated tax rate is declining, even to zero, without a 
nominal declension in the rate structure: it is as if there is a ―shadow‖ rate 
structure for medical and educational spending affecting the taxpayer‘s 
marginal work decisions.  
Saving for medical emergencies or educational uses may be special 
and limited cases, and may also lack the general feature of public goods. 
Under a progressive spending tax, however, all saving has the structure of 
Diamond‘s charitable contribution deduction. If high-ability taxpayers are 
motivated to continue saving under a spending tax, they will not be 
deterred from productive labor effort under high marginal spending tax 
rates, except to the extent that the taxpayers incorporate future spending tax 
liabilities into their current work decisions. The wider society benefits from 
their continued work effort, the positive externalities of the private capital 
or saving, and the implicit deferred taxation on the ultimate use of the 
funds. 
It should be evident that the case for more steeply progressive rates 
under a spending tax turns on why people save. In particular, the technical 
question is what ex ante incentives to work will exist under a progressive 
spending tax (for the labor effort comes today, whereas ultimate 
spending—and the taxes along with it—come later)? 
B.  WHY DO PEOPLE SAVE? THE RATIONAL STORY 
The question for analyzing optimal spending tax rates is how the 
socially productive decisions to work or save would be affected by high 
marginal tax rates on the private-regarding act of spending.110 Because a 
saver is, by definition, not spending all that he or she could in the present 
period, the ultimate tax rate the saver might face—as well as the 
conceptually different tax rate he or she might anticipate ultimately 
 
 110. We understand the usual objection that ―consumption is good,‖ the so-called ―engine of our 
economy.‖ See MCCAFFERY, supra note 40, at 118–19. We offer only two quick responses here. One, 
saving is also good, and saving is the analytic complement of consumption: saving is nonconsumption, 
as the Haig-Simons definition helps us to see. Two, the hope for at least the welfarist argument for a 
progressive spending tax is that the change from the status quo be revenue-neutral and preserve at least 
as much total spending. The idea is that the behavioral responses of the rich or high-ability—both 
toward more saving and, for those who continue to spend, toward more tax—will enable a welfare gain 
that will lead to lower spending tax rates (compared to the status quo ante) and hence more spending 
among the lower and middle classes. Put another way, the hope for a progressive spending tax is that 
the wealthy save more in part so that the not-wealthy can spend more. 
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facing—depends on why he or she is saving. In this part, we consider 
various possible motives for saving consistent with a traditional ―rational‖ 
actor model. Our main task for now is to sketch the possibilities. 
Recall the economist‘s triad of life cycle, precautionary, and bequest 
uses of savings. Consider how each use of savings affects the labor supply 
decisions of rational taxpayers under a progressive spending tax.  
A traditional life cycle saver—what we call a ―smoother‖—will 
anticipate during his or her peak earning years that his or her tax rate at the 
time of ultimate spending will be lower than it is today, by the definition of 
smoothing. Recall the figure. The deterrent effect of the tax rate schedule 
will be dampened, down to his or her anticipated level of spending. This 
reflects a smoothing process that makes spending exhibit less annual 
variation than does labor income, such that average tax burdens under a 
spending tax will be lower than those under a wage or income tax, with a 
progressive tax imposed on an annual basis, given the same rate schedule. 
The nominal marginal tax rates can increase without necessarily deterring 
present-period labor—no one need pay the higher marginal rates. Note also 
that the rational life cycle saver will not be expecting any ―windfall‖ yield 
to capital, and so such unanticipated good fortune will not, by definition, 
affect his or her labor supply decisions today.111 
Suppose, to make intuitions sharp, that a high tax rate of 50 percent or 
more kicked in at $250,000 of spending. A taxpayer with the opportunity to 
earn $300,000 a year would not be affected by that highest bracket if he or 
she planned on saving at least $50,000, perhaps to fund a constant material 
lifestyle at $250,000 of pretax spending through retirement, or if he or she 
were paying off student loans, which would be deductible under a 
consistent spending tax (the tax having come due when the borrowed funds 
were spent in youth).112 The progressive spending tax might push the 
taxpayer to save more or might allow him or her to do what he or she wants 
to do anyway, all without affecting additional labor supply decisions today. 
Note, however, that a progressive spending tax could affect the 
rational taxpayer‘s retirement decision. Picking up the prior example, after 
years of saving $50,000 or more, once the taxpayer‘s savings account was 
sufficiently large such that, on an annuitized basis, his or her lifetime 
spending needs were met, the purely rational, self-regarding life cycle saver 
 
 111. See infra Part VIII.C.  
 112. See McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 828 (discussing the treatment of 
debt). 
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might stop working. But of course that is also true under a wage or income 
tax: once anticipated lifetime consumption is fully funded, the rational 
taxpayer lacking any other motive for amassing capital would cease to 
work. Bill Gates knows this. And retirement savings today are already 
generally taxed under a wage or spending tax model.113 
The rational precautionary saver need not be deterred at all from work 
effort today by a progressive spending tax that exempted the precautionary 
uses from its base. This lack of deterrence is parallel to the effect of the 
charitable contribution deduction under the Diamond analysis discussed 
above. In essence, anticipated precautionary expenditures that are exempt 
face a zero rate of taxation, without such a rate being explicitly in the rate 
schedules. This result follows, again, from the combined consideration of 
bases and rates. There are of course complex and contestable policy 
questions as to whether private medical or educational expenditures should 
be fully or even partially excludable from a spending tax base. We take no 
position on that set of arguments here. We simply note that a further reason 
to exempt certain expenditures in whole or in part from a spending tax base 
is that, to the extent taxpayers might rationally save for such needs, the 
effect of the exemptions can be to diminish the labor supply disincentive 
effects of progressive marginal spending tax rates. 
But most uses of savings seem to be for something other than life 
cycle or precautionary uses. Studies using this traditional economics 
vocabulary consistently show that a significant percentage of private capital 
is passed on intergenerationally, in what economists call ―bequest 
savings.‖114 This is simply a residuum category, and possibly less 
responsive to ex ante labor incentives than are other economic decisions to 
be considered by optimal spending tax analysis. Perhaps savings that get 
passed on were intended to be used for life cycle or precautionary purposes, 
but the rainy day never came, or death came too early. These may be 
referred to as ―accidental bequests.‖115 In such cases, the analysis is as 
 
 113.  For example, a Roth-style IRA, I.R.C. § 408A (2006), applies a wage-tax model to retirement 
savings, which, especially in the case of ―windfall‖ returns, see infra Part VIII.C, would encourage 
earlier retirement.  
 114. 3 B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxation and Saving, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra 
note 61, at 1173, 1195 (surveying the literature and finding between 25 and 50 percent of total wealth is 
due to intergenerational transfers); Wojciech Kopczuk & Joseph P. Lupton, To Leave or Not to Leave: 
The Distribution of Bequest Motives, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 207, 230 (2007) (―We estimate that about 
75% of a representative sample of elderly single households has a desire to leave an estate with positive 
net worth. . . . [A]lmost four-fifths of household wealth we estimate will be bequeathed, [and] about 
half will be due to a bequest motive.‖). 
 115. See Bernheim, supra note 114, at 1196; Kopczuk, supra note 90, at 145–46; Kopczuk & 
Lupton, supra note 114, at 209.  
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above because the labor supply effect looks to the ex ante incentives: if a 
taxpayer thinks that he or she will need funds for life cycle and 
precautionary needs, she will rationally factor in the tax consequences of 
such uses at the time of his or her labor supply decisions. Hence a general 
risk aversion might favor social welfare under a progressive spending tax, 
as some individuals might continue to save beyond a more risk-neutral 
perception of their need.  
Given what we know of the wealthy, however, it seems unlikely that 
all or even most of bequest savings comes from miscalculations of own-
generation life cycle or precautionary needs: both annuities and insurance 
markets allow for fairly precise life cycle and precautionary savings these 
days,116 and much evidence shows that the wealthy continue to save, not 
fully dissave, until the end of their lives.117 What is going on? 
Intergenerational or bequest savers might be motivated to pass wealth on to 
their heirs. Then the question becomes what, if any, tax rates on the heirs 
do these dynastic savers internalize in their labor supply decisions today?118 
All of this discussion is speculation, and thus forms part of the new 
research agenda we aim to be announcing, but it is possible that many 
wealthy benefactors will expect their heirs to live as they did: that is, 
somewhat frugally, leaving a bequest at the end of their days. Such 
potential benefactors might even welcome a progressive spending tax, 
which would form a kind of social ―spendthrift trust‖ for their heirs. Some 
evidence to support this possibility is the fact that many wealthy 
individuals now privately create just such trusts, limiting access to wealth 
to set levels of income and certain urgent needs of the beneficiaries.119 
 
 116. Kopczuk & Lupton, supra note 114, at 146 
 117. Michael D. Hurd, Savings of the Elderly and Desired Bequests, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 298, 298 
(1987) (noting that most research suggests that wealth increases with age).  
 118. Another question, or set of questions, would look to the work incentive effects on these heirs 
from receiving the bequest; note that under a progressive-spending-without-estate tax, the bequest 
might come late in these heirs‘ lives, when their lifetime patterns of work and saving have largely been 
set. One of us has argued separately that a consistent progressive spending tax needs no separate gift 
and estate tax, for the simple reason that ―dead men don‘t spend.‖ See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Tax 
Reform to Die For, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at A12. A consistent spending tax of the sort 
considered in the text makes ultimate spending the measure for taxation. Death or any other time of 
wealth transfer preserves the private savings in the capital stock and would not trigger a tax: spending 
by the heirs or donees would. In essence, this is a ―carryover basis‖ regime for bequests as for gifts, 
although there is no ―basis‖ under a spending tax, as saving has not been taxed. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) 
(granting a ―stepped-up basis‖ on bequests); id. § 1015(a) (mandating a ―carryover basis‖ on gifts). So, 
heirs take wealth with a basis of zero, in effect. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 40, at 103. This feature of 
the analysis is logically separate, so we take no position on an estate tax vel non here. 
 119. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: 
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 360–61 (2005) (discussing the use 
DO NOT DELETE 9/30/2010 3:06 PM 
1076 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1031 
 
Accidental and intentional bequests do not exhaust the potential 
reasons for ―excess‖ savings that have some individuals leaving this earth 
with private capital in tow. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that many 
wealthy individuals simply get a consumption value from owning capital 
itself: they enjoy having large stores of wealth, take comfort in it, enjoy 
making investment decisions, and so on. Some may even have ultimate 
philanthropic motives, as in the Diamond analysis, or in the real-world 
cases of Bill Gates and Warren Buffet. The critical point is that, from the 
evidence we now have at hand, many wealthy people seem motivated to 
save for reasons other than presently anticipated own-consumption, and 
these motivations might make them continue to work in the face of more 
steeply progressive marginal spending tax rates, which they—quite 
rationally—would not anticipate ever paying.  
C.  A WINDFALL BENEFIT? 
There is another reason to believe that labor market earnings might not 
be as responsive to high marginal spending tax rates as they are to wage or 
income tax rates. It derives from uncertainty in the yield to labor as well as 
the yield to capital. Such uncertainty has multiple origins: individuals do 
not know exactly what effect today‘s labor effort will have on ultimate 
labor compensation (in the form of bonuses, subsequent promotions and 
raises, job satisfaction that encourages delayed retirement, and so on), and 
they do not know what rate of return they will receive on their savings. 
Individuals who are lucky, whose returns ultimately exceed their 
expectations—such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffet—tend to have the 
greatest spendable wealth, the highest spending levels, and therefore will 
face the highest spending tax rates. Since these high spending tax rates 
were unanticipated at the prior time of earning labor income—the good 
luck or windfall by definition being unexpected—it follows that the high 
spending tax rates will not have had the same discouraging effect on labor 
supply that they would have if known at the time of earning, as would by 
definition be the case under wage or income taxes. Lucky returns or 
windfalls of some sort are apt to be a major source of funding-enhanced 
material lifestyles or upward ―shifts‖ in the perspective of the figure. Recall 
that a progressive spending tax, but not a wage tax, falls on such resources 
when consumed. 
Uncertainty in the yield to labor and yield to capital gives yet another 
 
of out-of-state trusts to avoid the rule against perpetuities so as to control trust assets for lengthened 
periods).  
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reason—aside from the motivations for private saving and capital 
accumulation, canvassed above—why it can be possible to design a 
spending tax with sharply redistributive marginal tax rates that nonetheless 
does not excessively discourage labor effort. In such a setting, a major 
function of a progressive spending tax system is to redistribute the 
unexpected portion of spending power—positive and negative—among 
laborers. Spending taxes offer a type of insurance against uncertain returns, 
and while the same is true of almost any progressive tax system, 
progressive spending taxes have the advantage that they partially insure all 
consumption risks. By contrast, a progressive wage tax partially insures 
against uncertainties in wages but not capital returns, and a progressive 
income tax partially insures against income uncertainties but does so at the 
cost of discouraging saving. Spending taxes uniquely offer the prospect of 
significantly redistributing unexpected returns without discouraging saving 
and without excessively discouraging labor supply ex ante. 
D.  A POSSIBLE SORT? 
We have been discussing why people work and save, more or less 
slipping into a standard academic conceit that all people are the same. Of 
course, they are not. We have no doubt that people are heterogeneous, such 
that high-ability taxpayers—the main focus of both optimal tax analysis 
and any call for greater progressivity in tax today—have a mix of motives 
for their work, saving, and spending decisions. Here we note another 
possibly beneficial effect of a progressive spending tax: its intrinsic ability 
to treat two types of taxpayers differently.  
Under a wage tax such as Mirrlees modeled, taxpayers face only one 
decision margin: to work or not. The fear that high-ability taxpayers may 
reduce their labor supply drove the analysis of declining marginal tax rates. 
Even if there were some inelastic high-ability workers, who would continue 
to work no matter what tax rate they faced at the margin, the tax rates on 
high-ability types would have to be low if there were a suitably high 
number of elastic taxpayers, such as, presumably, Joe the Plumber. In such 
a case, the inelastic high-ability taxpayers would get a windfall, as it were. 
This problem has led some to look for ―markers‖ of elasticity (or ability), 
such that an income or wage tax could better differentiate among high-
ability types.120 But there are practical, political, legal, and moral questions 
 
 120. Kyle Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available 
Genetic Information, 61 NAT‘L TAX J. 843, 844–45 (2008). 
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with any such approach. 
Under a progressive spending tax, in contrast, there are two decision 
margins: to work or not, and to spend or save. This leads to a natural ―sort‖ 
among high-ability types, based on their propensities to spend currently. 
Imagine that there are two types of high-ability earners. Type one, 
captured in such contemporary bestsellers as The Millionaire Next Door,121 
is a frugal sort, inclined to save—a noble Ant to the end. Type two, as 
described in such contemporary analysis as Robert Frank‘s Luxury 
Fever,122 is a Grasshopper type, addicted to spending his wealth in a showy 
fashion. Although, once again, more analysis is needed, it is at least 
possible—dare we say likely?—that the Ant is more elastic in his or her 
labor supply than the Grasshopper. The Ant is frugal, after all, and hence 
more likely to be concerned with prices and taxes. He or she might well 
stop working under high labor tax rates. The Grasshopper, in contrast, 
looks like a consumption addict: a lamentable personality type, to be sure, 
but just the kind of person that optimal tax advocates should want to tax. A 
progressive spending tax, by design, would fall more heavily on 
Grasshopper than on Ant. Such a tax holds out the possibilities for sorting 
the rich and highly able into elastic and inelastic segments, based on their 
propensities to spend, allowing society to extract a higher tax burden from 
spenders while continuing to enjoy the benefits of the productive activity of 
both savers and spenders as well as the thrift of the worker-savers. 
E.  BEHAVIORAL MODELS 
The analysis in this part, including that contained in the Diamond 
paper, has been predicated on a traditional ―rational actor‖ model. There is 
nothing irrational about saving for one‘s retirement, for precautionary 
needs, for one‘s heirs, or simply to enjoy the psychic pleasures of owning 
independent stores of capital. There is no disputing tastes, after all, in 
traditional economics analysis.123 Certainly a spend-it-all-and-die-broke 
mindset is not irrational. But a growing field of research, behavioral 
economics, has challenged the assumptions of the rational model. Much of 
this literature has focused on saving and other behaviors with intertemporal 
consequences. Richard Thaler and colleagues, for example, have famously 
 
 121. THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR: THE 
SURPRISING SECRETS OF AMERICA‘S WEALTHY (1996). 
 122. ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: MONEY AND HAPPINESS IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999). 
 123. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. 
REV. 76, 89 (1977). 
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argued for a ―behavioral life-cycle hypothesis‖124 to supplant the rational 
life cycle hypothesis of Franco Modigliani125 and others. Under a 
behavioral view, ordinary persons make a variety of ―mistakes‖ in their 
saving behavior, on account of such heuristics and biases as myopia, time-
inconsistent preferences, the use of mental accounts, and so on.126 
What might be the relevance of behavioral insights to our analysis 
here? Once again, we hope to be opening up a research agenda. We believe 
it important that such an agenda have a behavioral component. Here we 
simply sketch some possibilities.  
The most common finding from behavioral economics on point is that 
people save too little.127 This myopic tendency to live for the day has led to 
the types of saving vehicles within the income tax that make it a ―hybrid,‖ 
as discussed above in Part VI, and as are featured in President Obama‘s 
budget proposals.128 Yet myopia also gives reason to doubt the efficacy of 
these ad hoc patches.129 The myopic tricked into opening an IRA can just 
as easily run up credit card debt or take out home equity loans. To put the 
matter generally and simply, a system such as the income tax that does not 
tax borrowing when incurred will face a difficult task in getting myopic 
people to save. A consistent spending tax, in contrast, eliminates the 
arbitrage opportunity, not by taxing saving—which it systematically does 
not do—but rather by taxing the debt-financed consumption.130 There is 
thus some reason to hope that the systematic exemption of saving under a 
progressive spending tax will encourage greater and more enduring saving 
than the ad hoc approaches under current law.131  
 
 124. Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26 ECON. 
INQUIRY 609, 609, 636–37 (1988). 
 125. See Modigliani & Brumberg, supra note 87.  
 126. See generally Richard H. Thaler et al., The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk 
Taking: An Experimental Test, 112 Q.J. ECON. 647 (1997) (myopia); Stephen J. Hoch & George F. 
Loewenstein, Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 492 
(1991) (time-inconsistent preferences); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 
MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985) [hereinafter Thaler, Mental Accounting] (mental accounts). 
 127. See, e.g., Bernheim, supra note 114, at 1200–08; James J. Choi et al., Saving for Retirement 
on the Path of Least Resistance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 14, at 304, 308 (―So far 
our data shows a familiar pattern. Respondents report that they save too little . . . .‖). 
 128. See Martin A. Sullivan, A Comparison of the 2010 and 2011 Budget Proposals, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Feb. 8, 2010, available at 2010 TNT 25-4 (LEXIS) (providing revenue estimates for automatic 
enrollment IRAs). 
 129. McCaffery, Behavioral Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform, supra note 97, at 474. 
 130. See Lawrence Zelenak, Debt-Financed Consumption and a Hybrid Income-Consumption 
Tax, 61 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1487582. 
 131. See supra Part VI. 
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We also suspect, and have found some confirmation in the literature, 
that the activity being taxed has salience.132 An income tax leads one to 
think about one‘s income, and thus to avoid the tax via leisure, or to 
convert it to ―nonincome,‖ or to hide it. A progressive spending tax ought 
to get one to think about his or her spending. We suspect tax-induced 
behavioral changes under a spending tax are more likely to come in regard 
to marginal decisions to spend or save rather than to work or not, although, 
rationally, today‘s work will usually affect tomorrow‘s spending. 
There are other places in the analysis of a progressive spending tax in 
which behavioral heuristics and biases might play a role. A persistent 
myopia, combined with self-serving optimism, may lead many people 
highly and perhaps completely to discount any tax on their saving. This 
result possibly obtains today: on a casual survey of friends and colleagues, 
almost all give some indication of the amounts in their tax-favored 
retirement accounts without discounting for the inchoate tax liability. This 
tendency could lead to a ―money illusion‖ under a consistent spending tax 
that might, ironically, lead to less saving.133 People would believe that they 
are wealthier, in after-tax terms, than they are: they will not be able to 
consume as much as they think they can. This ―behavioral income effect,‖ 
as it were, of the savings accounts under a consistent progressive spending 
tax could then lead to less saving.134 On the other hand, the substitution 
effect would cut in the other direction, as spending faces an increasing 
marginal tax rate whereas saving, more so under a behavioral perspective, 
faces a low or even zero rate of taxation.135 And the money illusion 
generated by the pretax accounts under a consistent spending tax ought to 
be less problematic than it is under the so-called income tax today because 
there would not be any ability to borrow tax-free with the pretax accounts 
in mind. People using ―mental accounts‖136 seem generally reluctant to 
invade capital, a phenomenon perhaps connected to the well-studied 
 
 132. This is the suggestion of the experiments reported in Blumpkin, Ruffle & Ganun, supra note 
108. Analytically equivalent income and consumption taxes induce different behavioral responses: 
individuals cut back on earning under an income tax and on spending under a spending tax. 
 133. Technically, ―money illusion‖ refers to the tendency to view economic matters in nominal 
rather than real terms, that is, crudely, to ignore the effects of time and inflation on real purchasing 
power. See Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond & Amos Tversky, Money Illusion, 112 Q.J. ECON. 341, 341 
(1997). We use it, somewhat idiosyncratically, to refer to what we believe is the common tendency to 
view pretax retirement savings accounts as if they were after-tax accounts.  
 134. See supra note 72 (discussing income versus substitution effects).  
 135. We say ―behavioral‖ here again because of what we take to be a common tendency to ignore 
or overly discount an ultimate tax; this tendency would be related to common heuristics and biases such 
as myopia, present-bias, and hyperbolic discounting. 
 136. Thaler, Mental Accounting, supra note 126. 
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―endowment effect,‖137 another reason to hope that the saving under a 
consistent progressive spending tax will be especially stable and enduring. 
Again, far more research is needed, but these are the kinds of 
questions that are worth asking. As a crude guess, we suspect that the 
optics of placing the tax on the act of spending will have beneficial effects 
in that people will not be as deterred from working or saving because of the 
logical remoteness of the tax, but that at least the wealthy will be deterred 
from additional high-end spending—which ought to be an effect desired by 
advocates of progressivity and redistribution. A progressive spending tax 
gets its redistribution, and seeks its relative equality, in the private 
consumption space of personal material lifestyles, what arguably ought to 
matter most to advocates of redistribution in the first place. 
IX.  THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 
We have discussed the relatively abstract analytics of tax, considering 
income, wage, and spending tax bases with progressive marginal rate 
structures. We turn now to a consideration of the real world of tax today, in 
the United States in particular. Three strong themes emerge.  
One, looking to the tax base, we see that we largely have a wage tax. 
This is so, both in regard to the so-called income tax alone—because this 
tax‘s commitment to taxing the yield to capital is highly porous, at best—
and when we widen the perspective to consider also the payroll or Social 
Security / Medicare tax system, a close second in total revenue to the 
income tax.138 The payroll tax does not even attempt to be anything other 
than a wage tax.  
Two, looking to the rate structure, we observe that it is highly 
compressed—indeed, it is quite close to being an optimal tax rate schedule, 
with low and declining rates on the most able and wealthy citizens. It 
would seem as if, despite its highly abstract quality and nearly four decades 
 
 137. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326 (1990) (―[T]he increased value 
of a good to an individual when the good becomes part of the individual‘s endowment [is] the 
‗endowment effect.‘‖). 
 138. In fiscal year 2009, individual income taxes accounted for 43.5 percent of all federal 
revenues; payroll taxes for 42.3. See U.S. GOV‘T PRINTING OFFICE, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 31 tbl.2.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy11/pdf/hist.pdf. This means that payroll taxes raised almost as 
much as personal income taxes, in part reflecting recession-induced declines in income tax collections. 
See id.; Andrew Mitrusi & James Poterba, The Distribution of Payroll and Income Tax Burdens, 1979–
99, 53 NAT‘L TAX J. 765, 771 tbl.2 (2000).  
DO NOT DELETE 9/30/2010 3:06 PM 
1082 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1031 
 
of qualifications, questions, and refinements, the optimal income tax 
tradition has had a strong influence in contemporary tax systems. Perhaps 
as important, the political and rhetorical arguments against high marginal 
tax rates on high earners have had enormous real-world traction, at least 
since the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s through the rise of Joe 
the Plumber.139 The economics, as mediated through political and popular 
processes, have led to what might be called ―everyday optimal tax theory,‖ 
borrowing and adjusting from Murphy and Nagel‘s term of ―everyday 
libertarianism.‖140  
Three, the United States does not have anything close to a lump-sum 
program of redistribution or demogrants, and is all but certain never to have 
one.141 
Combining these themes leaves us with a relatively flat-rate wage tax, 
with declining tax rates on the high ability, limited redistribution today, and 
little hope for more tomorrow. The balance of this part explores these 
claims and comments further. 
A.  TAX TODAY 
The so-called income tax in the United States is in reality largely a 
wage tax, for structural and ad hoc reasons. The structural reasons relate to 
such deep-seated features of the income tax as the ―realization 
requirement‖ and the nontaxation of debt, which in turn render such 
features as low tax rates on capital gains and corporate dividends virtually 
inevitable.142 The ad hoc reasons include the panoply of ostensibly 
prosaving provisions, modeled along both wage and spending tax lines, 
such as traditional and Roth IRAs, § 529 plans,143 and so on, considered 
above.144 When we add the increasingly important payroll tax system—
which does not purport to be anything other than a wage tax—onto the 
income tax, the theme is clear enough.  
Turning from base to rate issues, table 4 combines income and payroll 
 
 139. See STEUERLE, supra note 6, at 79–83 & passim; Bartels, supra note 14; Leonhardt, supra 
note 11; Viard, supra note 18. 
 140. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 48, at 31. 
 141. See infra Part IX.B.  
 142. See McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 886–92. See generally Gordon, 
Kalambokidis & Slemrod, supra note 97 (discussing the role of doubt in undercutting capital taxation 
under actual income tax).  
 143. I.R.C. § 529 (2006) (qualified tuition programs).  
 144. See McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 899–900. 
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rates for an individual in 2009.145  
 
TABLE 4.  Payroll and Income Tax Rates (approx.), Single Person, 2009 
Income Payroll Tax (%) Income Tax (%) Combined (%) 
$0–$10,000 15.3 0 15.3 
$10,000–$18,000 15.3 10 25.3 
$18,000–$43,000 15.3 15 30.3 
$43,000–$92,000 15.3 25 40.3 
$92,000–$106,000 15.3 28 43.3 
$106,000–$181,000 2.9 28 30.9 
$181,000–$382,000 2.9 33 35.9 
$382,000 and above 2.9 35 37.9 
This rate structure begins to look like an optimal income tax. It 
features marginal tax rates that peak in the middle income ranges and then 
gradually decline. Looking at just these two taxes combined, for now, 
marginal tax rates peak at 43.3 percent over the $92,000–$106,000 range of 
incomes. Marginal rates then fall, to 30.9 percent, before rising a bit at the 
end, to wrap up at 37.9 percent over $382,000 of taxable income.  
This is well on its way to being an optimal income tax rate structure, 
as suggested by Mirrlees. Note that President Obama‘s proposed changes 
would only raise the last two income tax brackets, the final one to 39.6 
percent, for a combined 42.5 percent rate on income—still below the 
middle-class peak. A fuller, richer understanding of the status quo suggests 
that the true picture is even closer to Mirrlees, and more dramatic in its 
peak-and-trough structure than this quick sketch. Consider three further 
factors.  
One, the earned income tax credit (―EITC‖) of I.R.C. § 32146 adds to 
the ―hump‖ effect in table 4 by placing a high marginal tax rate burden on 
the working poor. This provision is the key element in the ―workfare‖ that 
largely replaced ―welfare‖ under President Clinton‘s reform, although the 
 
 145. I.R.C. §§ 1, 63, 3101. Since benefit formulas tie ultimate Social Security benefits to payroll 
tax payments, it follows that payroll tax burdens differ in kind from income tax burdens for which the 
government does not offer individual taxpayers anything in return. Nevertheless, the highly incomplete 
matching of benefits to an individual‘s tax payments during the working lifetime gives payroll taxes an 
important tax aspect. 
 146. Id. § 32. 
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EITC dates back to the early 1970s.147 The credit works like a negative tax, 
giving the working poor additional resources. The problem is, it is repaid 
by the near-poor via a ―phase-out‖ that works just like a positive marginal 
rate bracket. This is an effort to minimize the cost of the program by 
preventing upper-middle income taxpayers from receiving benefits. Thus, a 
single parent with two children, having received a benefit of approximately 
$4000 on her first $10,000 of labor market earnings, must pay this benefit 
back by facing an additional tax of some 21 percent on her earnings 
between approximately $20,000 and $40,000 dollars. This EITC phase-out 
puts her in a 50 percent combined marginal rate bracket over this range, 
adding the EITC phase-out onto the rates in table 4. 
Two, in addition to the phase-out range of the EITC, there are a host 
of other phase-outs of means-tested programs facing the working lower-
middle income class. In a paper published in 1999, Daniel Shaviro showed 
that marginal tax rates facing some working poor can equal or exceed 100 
percent, an astonishing if unintended feature of overlapping programs, but 
one that has been well verified (and left largely unchanged) since then.148  
Three, at high levels of income, the actual marginal taxes individuals 
face depend critically on sources of income and avoidance possibilities: the 
gap between ―income‖ and ―taxable income‖ generally grows with 
income.149 Many wealthy taxpayers in fact face marginal rates of 15 
percent or even 0 percent on the last dollar that they earn, because they are 
able to gain wealth in the form of taxable capital gains or untaxed capital 
appreciation. Hedge fund managers fall into the former camp; Bill Gates, 
Warren Buffet, and other billionaires into the latter.150 This is, of course, a 
perfectly understandable—even satisfying—state of affairs to those steeped 
in the Mirrlees model and tradition.  
Thus, we conclude that the ―real world‖ in the United States looks 
roughly like a Mirrlees optimal income tax both in its base—that is, 
 
 147. See generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (discussing the historical background of the 
EITC, inter alia); Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV. 445 (1999) 
(discussing inter alia the reform of the EITC under President Clinton). 
 148. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, EMPLOYMENT POLICIES INST., EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES ON 
LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 7 (1999), available at http://www.epionline.org/studies/shaviro_02-
1999.pdf. See also Stephen D. Holt & Jennifer L. Romich, Marginal Tax Rates Facing Low- and 
Moderate-Income Workers Who Participate in Means-Tested Transfer Programs, 60 NAT‘L TAX J. 253, 
260 (2007) (finding a marginal rate exceeding 100 percent). 
 149. Slemrod, supra note 75, at 165–66, 173–74. 
 150. On the former problem—the ability of sophisticated financiers to receive compensation taxed 
at favorable capital gains rates—see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89 (2008).  
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wages—and in its rate structure. The implementation is not precise, at least 
in part because there are no generally accepted precise findings from 
optimal tax itself. Some of the imprecision also no doubt derives from 
pragmatic and practical constraints: for example, and perhaps most 
important, there is a single rate structure that applies to all individuals, 
without excessive particularization. The only way to particularize taxes 
today is through the base, where taxpayers indeed often face decision 
margins—whether to give to charity, save, spend on medical needs, and so 
on. This continues to be the principal theme in this Article, namely, the 
need to consider the base and rate aspects of tax systems hand-in-hand. But 
individuals do not face particular rate structures based on their 
characteristics: the government does not attempt to tax I.Q. or look to 
genetic ―markers‖ to individuate taxes.151 Taxes are collected on an annual 
basis using accounting information, and reflect other practical and realistic 
considerations.  
Other features of the real rate structure seem to reflect pragmatic and 
political compromises. For example, a perceived popular political desire 
not to allow high-income taxpayers to pay nominally zero taxes led to the 
adoption of the alternative tax minimum,152 although Congress has never 
changed any of the structural elements of the income tax that allow those 
living off of stores of financial capital to pay little or no taxes by showing 
little or no taxable income.153 Yet when all is said and done, what is 
remarkable is how much reality follows abstract theory. As John Maynard 
Keynes put it, ―Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist,‖154 in this case, the not-defunct James Mirrlees and his 
followers. 
B.  ON NOT ADDING DEMOGRANTS TO THE MIX 
We just noted that the United States tax system, in its base and its 
general rate structure, looks like an optimal tax model. For the system fully 
to conform to Mirrlees‘s sketch of the ideal, however, there would also 
need to be demogrants, or lump-sum transfers to all. This step is necessary 
 
 151. See, e.g., Logue & Slemrod, supra note 120, at 844–45. 
 152. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Emil M. Sunley, Minimum Taxes and Comprehensive Tax 
Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 385, 388 
(Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1988). 
 153. McCaffery, A New Understanding, supra note 23, at 885–91, 903–08. 
 154. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 
383 (1936). 
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to bring about average rate progression and hence redistribution given the 
pattern of quickly rising then gradually declining marginal tax rates.  
But we have no demogrants. As others have pointed out, the United 
States is highly unlikely ever to offer demogrants on anything close to the 
scale contemplated by the standard optimal income tax model.155 Certainly 
only very modest government support is currently available to Americans 
without other sources of income. On a quick impression, the EITC might 
look like a demogrant. But on closer inspection, it is far from it and, in fact, 
constitutes significant evidence that America is unlikely ever to have a 
major demogrant-like program. The EITC, after all, is set as a percentage 
of earned income: it is not a lump sum, but, in effect, a negative marginal 
tax rate. This was an important, consciously chosen design feature of the 
program. The significant expansion of the EITC under President Clinton 
formed the lynchpin of the ―end [of] welfare as we know it,‖156 ―making 
work pay,‖157 and moved ―welfare to workfare.‖158 Far from the optimal 
tax result that demogrants plus high marginal tax rates on the poor deter the 
least able from working—a feature that Mirrlees himself found attractive, 
at least during times of high unemployment,159 and which others, such as 
Louis Kaplow, are willing to accept as a perhaps inevitable byproduct of 
other desirable properties160—American social policy seems to have a 
strong principle of encouraging the low-income to work. 
There are also perfectly strong rational reasons to stay away from 
demogrants. Quite apart from a prevailing political orthodoxy that is 
skeptical of demogrants even if they did not trigger costs, lump-sum 
transfers are of course not costless. Money given unconditionally to 
citizens is money that the government either must raise with taxes or else 
divert from other spending priorities. Presumably the public likes the other 
spending programs now in place, many of which have redistributive and 
―social safety net‖ components to them. There is a tremendous ―stickiness‖ 
in the status quo: a reluctance to cut spending programs already in place, a 
social fact that might relate to certain well-known cognitive biases and 
tendencies such as the endowment effect.161  
 
 155. See KAPLOW, supra note 48, at 175–78 & passim; MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 48, at 138–
39; Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 48, at 60–61.  
 156. Helping the Poor: From Welfare to Workfare, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 71.  
 157. Preston Lerner, Making Work Pay, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1994, at 27. 
 158. Helping the Poor: From WelfarWelfare to Workfare, supra note 156. 
 159. Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 207. 
 160. Kaplow, supra note 49, at 1649. 
 161. Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Starving the Beast: The Political Psychology of 
Budget Deficits, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 221, 
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Even if there were a political will to provide significant demogrants, 
how then would they be financed? Higher marginal tax rates on middle-
income taxpayers, the most likely source of significant tax revenue, create 
unappetizing disincentives and thereby likely greater efficiency losses than 
even the average dollar of tax revenue does currently.162 Engrafting more 
taxes—perhaps significantly more taxes—onto the status quo discussed 
above runs the risk of pushing inframarginal rates, already above 100 
percent for some, as we pointed out in the prior section, even higher. This 
result would then run counter to the pro-work principle in American social 
policy. There can also be no iron-clad guarantee that a government 
composed of flesh-and-blood human beings, having found a means to raise 
revenues, would in fact remain committed to the spending program of the 
demogrant system: there is a great deal of evidence bred of experience—as 
with the supposed dedication of lottery proceeds to education or in the so-
called flypaper effect—that spending programs can go askew.163 Further, in 
times of budgetary stringency, a demogrant would be the easiest 
expenditure to cut, or not to increase. The reality of political and social life 
is that every epoch is an age of budgetary stringency. Demogrants would be 
a frail social safety net on which to depend.  
And so, although it does not have the status of analytic truth, it 
appears unrealistic that the United States would adopt a major demogrant 
program. It is important, therefore, to consider the significance of this 
absence of demogrants. 
C.  PROGRESSION WITHOUT DEMOGRANTS 
It comes down to this: we have, roughly, an optimal tax base and rate 
structure with no demogrants and hence limited redistribution and 
progressivity in average tax rates. What to do? 
Many scholars seem to assume that the optimal tax findings are all of 
a piece, such that it is somehow illegitimate or inappropriate to take 
arguments for and analysis of the rate structure and divorce these from the 
case for demogrants. In sum, without demogrants, optimal tax has nothing 
to say to the public political discourse. The philosophers Murphy and 
Nagel characteristically state this case in the strongest and most colorful 
 
224 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008).  
 162. See Martin A. Feldstein, The Effects of Taxes on Efficiency and Growth, 111 TAX NOTES 
679, 679–80 (2006).  
 163. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 
163–66, 227–28 (1989); Hines & Thaler, supra note 105, at 223–24 (flypaper effect). 
DO NOT DELETE 9/30/2010 3:06 PM 
1088 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1031 
 
language: 
But there is one very important point to make about economists‘ lessons 
on the distinction between ends and means. If we are told that lower 
marginal rates coupled with a demogrant would be better even from the 
point of view of a strongly egalitarian theory of justice than graduated 
rates with a high marginal rate at the top, that gives us absolutely no 
reason to abandon high marginal rates without introducing a demogrant. 
This is blindingly obvious. But in practice the point is frequently 
ignored. It is frequently claimed, for example by Joseph Stiglitz, that the 
conclusions of optimal tax theory were an influence on the trend to much 
lower marginal tax rates in the 1980s. This trend has been linked not 
with a greater role for cash transfers, but rather the reverse. No one 
concerned with welfare, not even utilitarians, can regard the growing 
inequality that has characterized the last two decades in the United States 
as an improvement from the point of view of justice. It is possible that, in 
its short-run practical consequences, economists‘ interest in the 
behavioral effects of taxation has done more harm than good to the cause 
of social justice.164 
It may be ―blindingly obvious‖ to Murphy and Nagel that there is 
―absolutely no reason to abandon high marginal rates without introducing a 
demogrant,‖ but we fail to see it. The critical point is that the revenue 
raising and expenditure aspects of optimal tax theory are analytically 
separate. They may be, and are, in the hands of the optimal tax theorists 
themselves, normatively connected. That is, there is or can be a reason to 
make the move Murphy and Nagel suggest, and argue for high marginal tax 
rates if demogrants are off the table: that reason is a foundational 
commitment to redistribution, come what may, such that advocates would 
be willing to choose progressive marginal rates without demogrants if 
demogrants were ruled out. We comment further on this set of policy 
prescriptions below. For now we simply note that there is no necessary 
reason why the government or wider society must accept the social welfare 
function used by the theorist, or even the general social welfarist 
framework. Having a revenue need, derived from whatever source, the 
optimal tax framework teaches a policymaker how most efficiently to meet 
it. And so there is, indeed, a reason—a compelling one—why policymakers 
should choose a pattern of declining marginal tax rates under a wage tax, 
even without demogrants. That reason is efficiency or wealth-maximization. 
Optimal tax‘s insight that a ―high marginal rate at the top‖ can be socially 
inefficient—wasteful—has nothing logically to do with the use or nonuse 
of demogrants.  
 
 164. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 48, at 138–39 (endnotes omitted). 
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Consider, to drive intuitions home, the social logic at least implicit in 
Murphy and Nagel‘s case for supporting high progressive marginal rates 
under an income tax in a world without demogrants. In order for this 
position to be coherent, people must accept a welfarist, utilitarian, or other 
argument for the degree of redistribution manifest in the optimal tax 
models: they want to redistribute. If they did not want to redistribute, they 
already would disagree with Murphy and Nagel, and Mirrlees for that 
matter. But then by stipulation the people have rejected demogrants, or the 
best means for achieving the ends of redistribution. Next, then, the people 
would have to support some inefficiency, or waste—perhaps some 
considerable waste, if the top marginal rate is high enough—in order to get 
more redistribution without the demogrants.165 In sum, under the structure 
of this logic, when people are committed to a significant level of 
redistribution or equity, they are willing to pay a high price—in 
inefficiency—not simply to get more equity or redistribution, but to get it 
without using the best means to do so, namely, demogrants. This 
willingness is possible—there is no disputing tastes, as the saying goes—
but certainly a bit odd. In a move familiar from the work of Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell, a Pareto improvement—of potentially large 
magnitude—would be possible because the more efficient means of 
achieving the same ends could bring vast wealth to the table.166 
Here is a different interpretation of the status quo, and the possible 
inchoate principles of the people. Society does not quite agree on any one 
social welfare function. It collectively chooses government programs, 
many of which are indeed redistributive, though redistributive in kind: 
education, national defense, environmental regulation, Social Security, 
Medicare, public health, and so on. Having chosen these expenditure 
programs with at least an eye toward equity, society seeks to raise revenues 
in the most efficient way. It experiments with high marginal tax rates, 
 
 165. Zelenak and Moreland give other reasons for supporting high marginal tax rates without 
demogrants. See Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 48, at 56–57. But, aside from their main argument—
that, without demogrants, high progressive marginal rates are the only means for achieving progressive 
average rates as well (the argument that is ―blindingly obvious‖ to Murphy and Nagel)—Zelenak and 
Moreland‘s other arguments have nothing logically to do with the absence of demogrants, and thus are 
refinements that can be made in the traditional optimal tax literature. See id. at 56. Thus, for example, if 
the high-ability are inelastic, marginal rates can be high ―at the top‖ even without demogrants. See id. at 
57. The fact that optimal tax models can but typically do not make these other assumptions is relevant.  
 166. See generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 57 (pressing the argument that laws of 
contract, tort, and so on, should be set with Paretian efficiency alone as a goal, and that the tax system 
should then redistribute increased wealth to serve ―fairness‖ objectives). 
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which might actually work better during war times, when first imposed,167 
but, over time, the people learn that such high tax rates distort labor supply 
decisions and lead to vast complexities and waste. Policymakers fret that 
people might stop working, migrate to other places, or spend time and 
resources converting the economists‘ potentially taxable income into 
untaxed, or lightly taxed, forms. In fact, they are right to have such 
concerns. Mirrlees and his contemporaries come along to give a formal 
gloss to these intuitions, and the people listen to and learn from the 
teaching of formal economists, even if they reject some of their more 
precise findings. The public does not want a top nominal tax rate of zero; 
we do not generally want to create incentives for people not to work; we do 
not want a massive tax and transfer program in a demogrant fashion 
engrafted onto what we are already spending money on. But voters do not 
want pure, spiteful waste, either—they do not want the most able and 
productive citizens sitting idly on the beach. So the government adopts a 
modified form of optimal taxation, particularly its general rate structure. 
The polity develops, that is, an everyday optimal tax. Joe the Plumber 
emerges from the hustings. 
The challenge is where to go next. How do we get more equity and 
redistribution, and more progressive marginal rates—which the public does 
seem to want—without abandoning major current public expenditure 
programs or instituting a massive new demogrant system, and without 
simply sacrificing wealth en masse on the altar of these preferences? Our 
answer—what we think is the last best hope for obtaining progressivity in 
tax—is to change the tax base. 
X.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This final part turns to normative considerations: why a progressive 
spending tax might, indeed, be a good policy option for the United States. 
It is not for scholars to dictate the good, of course. We simply sketch out 
how a progressive spending tax might be the ideal tax base–rate pair under 
a traditional welfarist conception, or how certain advocates of social-
contractarian or fairness-based perspectives might come to see it as the best 
alternative. In all this discussion, there are many empirical claims and 
issues that need to be developed: certain important questions have not yet 
been asked, or asked well and often enough, in part because a traditional 
analytic view of tax has impeded them.  
 
 167. See BANK, STARK & THORNDIKE, supra note 6, at 84. 
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We first sketch out four distinct paths for tax‘s future, then we turn to 
the normative arguments for a progressive spending tax, and conclude with 
a call for more research. 
A.  PATHS TO A MORE PROGRESSIVE FUTURE 
The prior part stressed three themes: America has (1) essentially a 
wage tax base; (2) a relatively flat, nearly ―optimal‖ tax rate structure; and 
(3) no demogrants. This combination leaves us with limited redistribution 
today and limited hopes for more tomorrow. Let us continue to assume, 
along with Murphy and Nagel and many others, that America right now is 
far from having obtained the redistributive goals and ambitions of optimal 
tax theory in the tradition of Mirrlees and others.168 We are a land of great 
inequality. How might we be transformed to a promised land of greater 
redistribution, in the spirit of optimal tax? There are four general 
approaches, looking at the tax and spending sides of the ledger, playing 
with different combinations of tax base, tax rates, and demogrants. 
One, the United States could eliminate or reduce all or most existing 
spending programs and substitute demogrants in their place. We humbly 
suggest once more that this is not going to happen. For better or worse, 
current spending programs are deeply entrenched. No American president 
or political party has succeeded in significantly reducing spending—the 
Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush certainly did 
not—and there is precious little reason to count on significant reductions 
any time soon. Indeed, the chief fiscal obstacle confronting the federal 
government is to reduce the rate of increase in government spending, 
especially on Social Security and, even more so, Medicare.169 
Two, the United States could engraft demogrants onto the existing 
spending platform. But, as we discussed in the prior part, this is not only 
 
 168. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 48, at 138–39. See also editorial commentary from Robert H. 
Frank, Hey, Big Spender: You Need a Surtax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/03/21/business/economy/21view.html (advocating for a progressive spending tax); Paul Krugman, 
Lies, Damned Lies, and Growth, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2010, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/24/lies-damned-lies-and-growth/ (advocating for higher tax rates); and Robert Reich, Why 
Democrats Are Afraid to Raise Taxes on the Rich, SALON.COM, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.salon.com/ 
news/opinion/feature/2007/10/25/taxes (advocating for more progressive taxation). The purpose of our 
Article is to show the way, as a positive matter, toward more redistribution or progressivity in tax, not 
to make the logically separate normative argument that such movement is necessary or desirable. 
 169.  ALAN J. AUERBACH & WILLIAM G. GALE, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE FISCAL CRISIS: 
2009 AND BEYOND: AN UPDATE 16–17 (2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009 
/06_fiscal_crisis_gale/06_fiscal_crisis_gale_update.pdf. 
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nearly as infeasible as cutting existing spending programs, it is also unwise, 
in part because it would ratchet up revenue-raising demands far beyond the 
capacity of the system to bear. 
Three, we could, without demogrants, change the marginal rate 
structure under the existing tax structure to create progressivity, perhaps 
even with high marginal rates at the top. This is the suggestion of Murphy 
and Nagel, Zelenak and Moreland, and at least a handful of liberal political 
commentators.170 It makes sense in theory, but we are skeptical in practice, 
for reasons we have detailed and built up throughout this Article. The 
efficiency losses from high marginal rates exist regardless of whether there 
are demogrants. Americans, since at least the 1980s, seem to have figured 
this fact out, as our quick survey of the political environment now and over 
the last several decades points out. Ignoring the lessons of optimal tax 
because the political system is not willing or able to adopt demogrants 
means being committed to accepting waste—burning money or psychic 
value—to achieve greater ―equity.‖ The country might indeed be willing to 
do this, to some small extent, at the margin: perhaps President Obama will 
get his way, and the top marginal rate under the income tax will return to 
39.6 percent. But that raises the troubling question that, if the United States 
is not willing to generate equity or greater redistribution efficiently, why 
would it be willing to do so inefficiently? And could we ever go any further 
than those modest steps sought by President Obama? 
This leaves the fourth option: to change the way the country taxes, 
specifically the tax base. Some might consider the possibility posed this 
way fundamentally inconsistent with the general approach. This Article has 
argued throughout that the way things are reflects a certain widespread and 
popular acceptance of the way things should, and hence must, be; this 
acceptance is the essence of ―everyday optimal tax theory.‖ We apply this 
logic, after all, to existing spending programs, as we just discussed, taking 
not only the status quo spending programs off the table for reform options, 
but also refusing to put a new demogrant program on the table. And we 
also apply this ―best of all possible worlds‖ logic to the structure of 
marginal tax rates under an income or wage-based tax.  
But we are not, after all, hard and fast skeptics for all reform. How can 
this be: how can we believe that the way things are reflects deeply 
entrenched policy preferences, positions, and practicalities, and yet there is 
still room for seemingly radical change? 
 
 170. See sources cited supra note 168. 
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Our answer lies in the different economic effects and political-
rhetorical properties of a progressive spending tax: a public policy option 
that has not been well enough studied or considered, in significant part 
because it has not been well enough understood,171 hence the descriptive 
task throughout most of this Article. Existing policy options, centered on 
the income tax, have forced the people to make a choice between equity 
and efficiency. The people have shown that they care about efficiency, at 
least to some considerable degree. Under a progressive spending tax, the 
nature of the tradeoff changes. The people might well be able to have their 
cake and eat it too: progressivity without deleterious effects on the 
productive activities of work and saving. If the research bears out our hopes 
and suppositions, we submit that this would be a set of policy outcomes 
that many Americans might well endorse. 
We now turn to the two normative arguments sketched out above. 
B.  THE WELFARIST ARGUMENT 
The goal of policy in a social welfare tradition is to maximize some 
specified index of aggregate individual well-being using a utilitarian 
calculus. The intuition that a progressive spending tax might score best 
under such an approach is that, of all base-rate pairs, such a tax might lead 
to the highest welfare in a classical welfare economics sense: that is, it 
gives a ―better,‖ more utility-maximizing optimal tax result than did 
optimal income tax analysis for Mirrlees and followers. We have developed 
the components of this argument throughout the Article. Partly it follows 
the Diamond approach, which itself is an example of formal welfarist 
analysis.172 Diamond showed that an income tax with a charitable 
contribution deduction can support higher marginal rates than such a tax 
without the deduction, both because the deduction diminishes the labor 
supply disincentive of the tax rates and because the charitable contributions 
are themselves public goods.173 Our argument in this Article discusses a 
generalized saving deduction rather than the charitable contribution 
deduction. Depending on why people save, how rational and risk averse 
they are, and what behavioral biases they might have, high spending tax 
rates need not deter ex ante labor supply decisions, and the overall private 
capital stock—a public good—will likely increase.  
 
 171. See Frank, supra note 168 (discussing the idea of a progressive spending tax on high 
spenders). 
 172. See Diamond, supra note 51, at 901–03. 
 173. Id.  
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A progressive spending tax falls on windfalls, which are likely to have 
diminished ex ante effects on labor supply efforts. Further, under a 
progressive spending tax, there is an intrinsic way differentially to tax 
inelastic high spenders, who will continue to work and pay the spending 
tax, on account of their inelasticity, while getting more saving with 
diminished work disincentive from elastic worker-savers. These were the 
hopes intimated in Part VIII, though they depend on data yet to be gathered 
and analysis yet to be done. The idea is to model plausible ranges of 
optimal spending tax structures and to compare them with the optimal 
income and wage tax structures produced thus far by scholars and in the 
real world. Once again, we believe that there is at least hope for greater 
progressivity under a spending tax, bearing in mind that Mirrlees himself, 
the progenitor of the optimal income tax field, found his own efforts at 
generating progressive income tax structures rather disheartening. 
C.  A FAIRNESS ARGUMENT 
Aside from efficiency or wealth-maximizing, the concern of a 
welfarist approach, many might accept a progressive spending tax for its 
fairness properties. Perhaps the simplest way to sketch out such an 
argument is to look at the various treatments of saving, where the 
differences among the various progressive tax base-rate pairs are most 
stark.  
An income tax, in theory, double taxes all saving. It is important to 
note that we have never come very close to an ideal income tax in the 
United States, as we noted in the prior part. This fact is both because it is 
practically difficult to tax many forms of saving—unrealized appreciation 
comes to mind—and because we seem to lack the will to double tax all 
saving—the nonincome taxation of most retirement savings within the 
nominal income tax comes to mind.  
A wage tax taxes no saving, by design.  
A progressive spending tax splits the difference, by design, and on 
principle, in particular taxing any unexpected yield to capital. 
With these analytic facts before us, we ask the normative question: 
What should be done about taxing saving? Mill‘s claim that the income tax 
is a double tax on saving is simply descriptive. It is true both within the 
income tax‘s own base, in which savers are penalized vis-à-vis spenders, 
and relative to a hypothetical no-tax world, in which the income tax 
destroys the equivalence, in present value terms, between savers and 
spenders, Ants and Grasshoppers. Yet neither of these facts exerts a strong 
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pull on moral intuitions; it is hard to get from Mill‘s is to any compelling 
ought. 
A strong sense of a compelling normative, fairness-based argument in 
contrast can be gleaned from the near century of experience with the 
income tax in the United States. At the dawn of the comprehensive 
individual tax system, reformers wanted an income tax because it included 
the yield to capital and thus would impose an added burden on financiers 
and the like.174 Those were, however, simpler times. As the income tax 
expanded in both scale, becoming a higher burden and more steeply sloped 
in its rate progression, and scope, reaching the majority of earners in the 
United States and elsewhere, things changed.175 Lawmakers began to have 
second thoughts about double taxing the yield to capital anywhere and 
everywhere. Exceptions to the income tax‘s theoretical commitment to 
double taxing saving have been piled on one another, whether by 
happenstance, inertia, deliberate policy plan, or mere mistake. The result is 
hybrid taxes, perched—typically uneasily—between an income tax model, 
with its double tax, and a consumption tax model, with its principled 
nontaxation of saving. But the compromises to bring about this state of 
affairs have been effected without much normative or practical reflection, 
resulting in a tax system in which the lucky and the well-endowed—the 
capitalist class—can live well and consume away, tax-free. The system 
neither favors new saving nor effects a fair distribution of tax burdens 
across taxpayers; individuals who can live off the yield to capital quite 
simply need pay no tax.  
On reflection, however—what we hope to have brought to bear in this 
Article—the seemingly divergent strands in contemporary tax systems are 
not random. Settled reflection reveals that ordinary moral intuitions may in 
fact reasonably reach different normative judgments about different uses of 
savings. How one uses his or her savings seems more important, from a 
political, moral, and social point of view, than the sources of such savings, 
which can be morally arbitrary: luck in many cases. On the one hand, one 
is sympathetic to the noble Ant, especially when she is manifest as a 
middle-aged wage-earner, struggling to make ends meet while paying her 
taxes and setting aside some funds for her later retirement, or for medical 
 
 174. For two among many sources of good political history of the income tax, see SHELDON D. 
POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY: REVENUE AND POLITICS (1996); and STANLEY, supra 
note 15, at 15–176. 
 175. See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of 
the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 685–86 (1988/89). 
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or educational needs within her family. Why should we punish her, with a 
second tax, for her prudence? And so the country has tax-favored 
retirement, medical, and educational savings accounts. On the other hand, 
one is haunted by the specter of the socially privileged, such as a second- or 
third-generation rich child, living well off the fruits of someone else‘s prior 
capital accumulation. Surely this ―trust-fund baby‖ should be taxed at least 
as much as the hard working Ant. Surely his or her income, in the form of 
rents, royalties, interest, dividends, and the like, should count in the tax 
base, at least as much as the product of Noble Ant‘s blood, sweat, and 
tears. 
These simple insights and intuitions cash out into the two norms about 
saving we introduced above. The yield-to-saving norm holds that capital 
that enables a higher, better lifestyle should bear a burden, one at least 
commensurate with normal wage earnings. The ordinary-saving norm holds 
that capital transactions (borrowing, saving, investing) that are simply used 
to move around uneven labor market earnings in time, allowing people to 
save for their retirements or for periods of high spending needs / low 
earnings—such as times of education or medical urgency—should not be 
double taxed or otherwise discouraged and burdened. Fitting these norms 
into our preferred vocabulary for saving, smoothing affects the ordinary-
saving norm, shifting the yield-to-saving norm. Indeed, shifting 
transactions are what are left once smoothing and precautionary uses have 
been subtracted out from the universe of all uses of savings. The net idea is 
that society ought not to burden smoothing transactions with a double tax, 
but that the yield to capital is an element of value that can properly be taxed 
when used to enable a ―better,‖ more expensive lifestyle. A progressive 
spending tax gives this result. 
We suggest that many might find this the ―fair‖ set of norms and 
principles to govern the taxation of saving, regardless of the efficiency 
arguments canvassed above. But we also cling to the hope that a 
progressive spending tax could deliver greater equity and efficiency than 
the alternatives. To sustain that claim, however, considerably more 
research is needed. 
D.  OUR LAST WORDS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
We did not come to offer definitive answers. We came rather to pose 
important questions. We believe that a great many citizens are interested in 
obtaining more progressivity from the tax system. We also believe that 
income and wage taxes—and we believe that the income tax is well on its 
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way to being a wage tax—are intrinsically limited in their abilities to bear 
any more progressivity than what they already obtain. Indeed, this was an 
insight that Mirrlees had at the dawn of the optimal income tax movement 
in the early 1970s. For both sound economics and not-unrelated political 
and rhetorical reasons, the current tax system offers only very limited hope 
for greater progression. See Joe the Plumber. Or see the Obama 
Administration‘s modest proposals to increase progressivity in tax and the 
utter failure to enact them to date.  
We believe that the best—possibly the only—way out of the bind, for 
those who want more progressivity, is to change what we are taxing: the 
tax base. There are good reasons to believe that a progressive spending tax 
could support higher and more steeply sloped marginal rates than could an 
income or wage tax. Many people in the face of progressive spending taxes 
will react by saving more rather than working less, an action that could be 
fully rational, depending on why they are saving and their anticipated tax 
rates on ultimate consumption. Greater saving under a progressive 
spending tax may also be consistent with certain behavioral biases. Society 
will benefit from the work effort, the increased saving, and the inchoate tax 
on ultimate consumption. Others, inelastic spenders—consumption 
addicts—may continue to work and spend, paying the high tax rates. 
Society will benefit from the greater tax revenue. Still others will see some 
considerable tax fall on their spending out of life‘s good fortune, windfall 
gains having little or no ex ante deterrent effects on their labor supply. 
Meanwhile, tax rates on lower- and middle-class consumption can be 
lowered. A progressive spending tax holds out hope for greater efficiency 
and equity. 
As of now, this is just hope: what we believe is the last best hope for 
progressivity in tax. To make it more real, we need more and better 
analysis of why people save, under both plausible rational and behavioral 
models. We need to understand more precisely how work effort might 
respond to progressive marginal spending tax rates. We also need to 
understand how the various practical forms of implementing a progressive 
spending tax would affect opportunities for evasion and noncompliance, 
and how these opportunities might undercut whatever gains could 
otherwise be expected. We suspect that a mixture of theoretical, applied, 
experimental, and other types of research will be needed. This research will 
all take some time.  
It is our final hope in this Article that such time be taken, such work 
be done. It is important work, which has been obscured by 
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misunderstandings about the analytics of taxation and a limited sense of the 
appropriate argument structure for consumption taxes. Putting aside 
metaphysical arguments about the double taxation of saving, yield-
exemption, and ―neutrality‖ between present and deferred consumption, 
and focusing instead on the end of redistribution, a spending tax might well 
be the last best hope for progressivity in tax.  
As we have said throughout, we came, not to save progressivity in tax 
itself, but to save the argument for others to have out. This is the fiscal 
agenda for the future. 
